Two Faces of Judicial Restraint (Or Are There More?) in McDonald v. City of Chicago

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I. INTRODUCTION

Since the days of the Warren Court, conservatives have attacked “judicial activism.”¹ Beginning with Judge Robert Bork’s Supreme Court nomination hearings, and lately with increasing frequency, liberals have sought to turn the tables.² Critics now charge that conservative judges are

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² See, e.g., id. at 176; Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textualism and Originalism?, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2387 (2006) (book review) (“The odd thing is that—unlike any earlier time in American history—both sides of the political spectrum proclaim
activists, especially when they undermine liberal precedents or strike down liberal legislation.³ Defenders of judicial activism have all but disappeared.⁴

One sign of this apparent consensus is that all Supreme Court nominees now promise to be paragons of judicial restraint. Any of the following quotes, for example, could easily have been uttered by any of the four most recent nominees:

- “I’m not quite sure how I would characterize my politics. But one thing I do know is that my politics would be, must be, have to be completely separate from my judging.

  And I—I agree with you to the extent that you’re saying, look, judging is about considering a case that comes before you, the parties that come [sic] before you, listening to the arguments they make, reading the briefs they file, and then considering how the law applies to their case—how the law applies to their case—not how your own personal views, not how your own political views might suggest, you know, anything about the case, but what the law says, whether it’s the Constitution or whether it’s a statute.

  Now, sometimes that’s a hard question, what the law says, and sometimes judges can disagree about that question. But the question is always what the law says.

- “Sometimes it’s hard to give meaning to a constitutional term in a particular case. But you don’t look to your own values and beliefs. You look outside yourself to other sources. This is the basis for, you know, that judges wear black robes, because it doesn’t matter who they are as individuals. That’s not going to shape their decision. It’s their understanding of the law that will shape their decision.

- “Judges have to be careful not to inject their own views into the interpretation of the Constitution, and for that matter, into the interpretation of statutes. That is not the job that we are given. That is not authority that we are given.

The role of judges is to interpret both the Constitution and law. Their role is to do both in accordance with their terms. And, so, that is the function of a judge.

Clearly, a judge looks at the terms and tries to, if it’s not—if it’s the Constitution, what are the principles that underlie that provision of the Constitution, and it’s informed by precedent. If it’s a statute, you use principles of statutory construction, starting always with the words, and you give effect to Congress’s intent. That’s the role of a judge.

I do not believe that judges should use their personal feelings, beliefs, or value systems or make their—to influence their outcomes. Some politicians and commentators have suggested that nominees are dissembling when they make such statements, and some of the sitting Justices have been accused of repudiating positions they took when seeking Senate confirmation. Usually, these charges are made by conservatives against liberals or by liberals against conservatives.

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What, if anything, can be done about nominees who drastically abandon positions taken at the confirmation hearings? . . .

I would like to put into the record the questioning that I made of Chief Justice Roberts which took 28 of my 30 minutes, and his concurring opinion in Citizens United which is an apology, a really repudiation of everything he testified to, just diametrically opposed. That concurring opinion goes into great detail as to why stare decisis ought not to be followed.

Id.; see also id. (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“[I]t is disconcerting, to say the least, where what appears to me, and in fairness, does appear to be a direct contradiction of what Judge Sotomayor said in her confirmation hearings [about the Second Amendment], with what she has decided on the first opportunity to decide a case on that same subject.”).

Disinterested observers are likely to recognize that generalized professions of modesty and restraint by judicial nominees are carefully designed to say next to nothing of any substance. At most, nominees now seem to promise that they will exhibit a certain *style* in their future work.

And that promise they generally do keep. The current members of the Supreme Court pretty consistently present their positions as manifestations of judicial restraint and frequently accuse their colleagues of violating this cardinal judicial virtue. Perhaps “judicial activism” just describes any decision with which the speaker very strongly disagrees.

Before accepting this conclusion, perhaps we should consider the possibility that there are analytically distinguishable forms of judicial restraint to which different Justices adhere. Academic commentators have articulated and defended various theories of judicial restraint, but my purpose here is to examine the debate “at work,” so to speak, in an actual case.

The Court’s recent decision in *McDonald v. City of Chicago* is an especially interesting example because strikingly different models of judicial restraint are adopted by subsets of the more conservative wing of

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8. See, e.g., *Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n*, 130 S. Ct. 876, 892 (2010) (“[T]he Court cannot resolve this case on a narrower ground without chilling political speech, speech that is central to the meaning and purpose of the First Amendment. It is not judicial restraint to accept an unsound, narrow argument just so the Court can avoid another argument with broader implications. Indeed, a court would be remiss in performing its duties were it to accept an unsound principle merely to avoid the necessity of making a broader ruling. Here, the lack of a valid basis for an alternative ruling requires full consideration of the continuing effect of the speech suppression upheld in *Austin.*)” (internal citation omitted); *id.* at 918 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“The majority’s step-by-step analysis accords with our standard practice of avoiding broad constitutional questions except when necessary to decide the case before us.”); *id.* at 979 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Our colleagues have arrived at the conclusion that *Austin* must be overruled and that § 203 is facially unconstitutional only after mischaracterizing both the reach and rationale of those authorities, and after bypassing or ignoring rules of judicial restraint used to cabin the Court’s lawmaker power.”).

9. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, “Activism as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure,” 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1057, 1077 (2002) (“Very little attention has been paid to the meaning of the term activism. The term serves principally as the utmost judicial put-down, a polemical, if unenlightening, way of expressing strong opposition to a judicial decision or approach to judging.”).


the Court, and subtly different models are adopted by subsets of the more liberal wing. A close look at the opinions in the case suggests that each model has different strengths and weaknesses, but also that the models are by no means created equal.

McDonald is a sequel to District of Columbia v. Heller, which was decided two terms earlier. In Heller, the Court undertook its first thorough consideration of the Second Amendment and resolved (at least as a matter of law) a longstanding academic debate about the nature of this constitutional provision. Writing for five members of the Court, Justice Antonin Scalia concluded (1) that individuals have a constitutionally protected individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, not just a right to serve in militias organized by state governments; and (2) that the District of Columbia’s handgun ban violated the Second Amendment.

Justices John Paul Stevens and Stephen G. Breyer each wrote dissenting opinions, both of which were joined by all four dissenters. Stevens disputed Scalia’s textual and historical analysis of the original meaning of the Amendment and argued that it was meant to protect only militia-related interests, not an interest in individual self-defense. Breyer contended that even if one accepted the majority’s mistaken understanding of the original meaning of the Second Amendment, it should still be interpreted to permit the District of Columbia handgun ban.

Immediately after the Heller decision was announced, separate sets of plaintiffs filed suits challenging similar handgun bans in Chicago and several of that city’s suburbs. Because Heller’s holding applies directly only to federal laws like the one in the District of Columbia, the plaintiffs invoked the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court and the Seventh Circuit rejected all of these claims on the ground that they were foreclosed by precedent.

The Supreme Court granted certiorari in one of the Chicago cases, and concluded that the Constitution’s protection of the right to arms applies to state and local laws in the same way that it applies to federal laws. Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr.’s plurality opinion for four Justices relied on the

13. Id. at 2799, 2821–22.
14. Id. at 2822–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 2847 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 3027. With respect to the claims under due process, the Seventh Circuit was quite wrong. See Nelson Lund, Anticipating Second Amendment Incorporation: The Role of the Inferior Courts, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 185, 191–96 (2008); see also Richard A. Epstein, NRA v. City of Chicago: Does the Second Amendment Bind Frank Easterbrook?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 997, 1000 & n.23 (2010) (“[T]he bulk of the legal authority goes against the [Seventh Circuit’s] opinion . . . .“). This issue is obviously now moot.
19. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3050.
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Justice Clarence Thomas rejected this approach but reached the same substantive conclusion under the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion for himself alone, and Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia M. Sotomayor.

II. PRECEDENT PLUS ORIGINALISM: JUSTICE ALITO’S PLURALITY OPINION

A. Precedent

Justice Alito’s plurality opinion treats fidelity to precedent as the centerpiece of judicial restraint. He begins with a thorough survey of the Court’s evolving approaches to the application of the Bill of Rights to the states. He then argues, and concludes, that the governing precedents require that the Second Amendment right be protected against state action under the Due Process Clause in the same manner that it is protected against federal action by the Second Amendment itself.

The Bill of Rights originally applied only to the federal government. Shortly after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868, the Slaughter-House Cases interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause very narrowly, holding that it protects only those rights that “owe their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its Constitution, or its laws.” In United States v. Cruikshank, the Court found that the right to keep and bear arms (and other rights protected by the Bill of Rights as well) pre-existed the federal Constitution. Accordingly, the rights were not protected under the Slaughter-House reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.

Beginning at the end of the 19th Century, and continuing somewhat fitfully thereafter, the Court took a new approach. Rather than revisit its precedents, however, the Court started making some provisions of the Bill of Rights (but not others) applicable to the states under a more general doctrine that has come to be known as substantive due process. This doctrine gives certain “fundamental rights” substantive protection, and the Court has applied the doctrine to the Bill of Rights through a process known as “selective incorporation.”

20. Id. Justice Scalia, who joined the plurality opinion in this case, also wrote a separate concurring opinion, which was limited to criticizing Justice Stevens’s dissent. Id. at 3050 (Scalia, J., concurring). Although the details of the debate between Scalia and Stevens are interesting, this Article requires only a brief discussion of the dispute between them. See infra note 148.
21. Id. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
22. Id. at 3028–36, 3046 (plurality opinion).
25. 92 U.S. 542, 551, 553 (1876).
26. This conclusion was reaffirmed with respect to the right to arms in Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 257–58 (1886), and Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 539 (1894).
27. The origin of this doctrine in federal law was Dred Scott’s conclusory holding that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protected the right of slave owners to take their peculiar form of property into the federal territories. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450
During the first half of the 20th Century, a number of rights were brought under the umbrella of substantive due process, but the Court also decided that several Bill of Rights provisions were not sufficiently fundamental to justify incorporation. Important decisions involving both enumerated and unenumerated rights were later overruled. Most of the individual rights listed in the Bill of Rights were eventually incorporated, but *McDonald* was the first case in which the Court agreed to decide how the selective incorporation doctrine applies to the Second Amendment.\textsuperscript{28}

The importance of precedent in Alito’s analysis is highlighted by his refusal even to consider the arguments for protecting the right to arms under the Privileges or Immunities Clause.\textsuperscript{29} These arguments had been pressed very strenuously by the *McDonald* petitioners and by a large and ideologically diverse collection of *amicis*. Alito acknowledged that *Slaughter-House* had been subjected to serious and widespread criticism, beginning with the four dissenters in *Slaughter-House* itself, and continuing with a wide range of modern scholars.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, Alito’s own survey of the Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence hardly depicts a well-reasoned or coherent body of case law. This line of cases includes numerous decisions overruling prior cases, as Alito’s opinion acknowledges, and the Court has never attempted to reconcile the doctrine with the text of the Due Process Clause. Why not rethink the matter now?

Alito’s answer to this question is brief and revealing. He notes that the petitioners’ lawyer was unable at oral argument to identify the “full scope” of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and he observes that the scholars who criticize the *Slaughter-House* interpretation of the Clause have not been able to agree among themselves about the correct interpretation. One might wonder why disagreements among scholars should prevent the Justices from doing their own research and reaching their own conclusions about the meaning of a constitutional provision. With their shrunken docket, large staffs, and long summer vacations, it is hard to believe that they are really too busy. One might also wonder why an advocate’s inability to identify the “full scope” of a constitutional provision should

\textsuperscript{28} McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3028–36 (2010) (plurality opinion).

\textsuperscript{29} Id. at 3030–31.

\textsuperscript{30} Id. at 3029–30.

\textsuperscript{31} Id. at 3030.
induce a court to disregard that part of the Constitution. Perhaps we should count ourselves lucky that the Court did not impose such demands on the advocates in Brown v. Board of Education32 or in Strauder v. West Virginia.33

In any event, nowhere in the opinion does Alito make any effort to defend Slaughter-House or its progeny, and he makes no effort to show that the modern doctrine of substantive due process has any basis in the Constitution. The implication seems to be that if there are doubts about the original meaning of a constitutional provision, it is better to accept whatever precedents happen to exist, even if that requires the Court to follow a line of case law that is itself chock-full of uncertainties. This suggests a very strong—if implicit—claim that judicial restraint consists primarily in fidelity to precedent.

Given this strong presumption that the original meaning of a constitutional provision is irrelevant once the Court has spent “many decades” deciding cases without making any inquiries about the original meaning,34 one would expect Alito to analyze the Second Amendment in much the same way that the Court has previously treated other substantive due process and selective incorporation cases.

At one level, Alito does exactly that. The legal test on which he relies is drawn from two cases, Duncan v. Louisiana35 and Washington v. Glucksberg.36 Duncan offered the Court’s most recent discussion of the principles of selective incorporation,37 and Glucksberg was a recent substantive due process case involving an unenumerated right. Alito points to similar formulations in both cases and concludes that the established test under substantive due process is whether a right is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” or, in other words, whether the right is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”38 One might quibble over whether these formulations adequately encapsulate the existing due process jurisprudence,39 but it would be difficult to find a demonstrably better statement of the approach that has emerged in the Court’s case law.40

33. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
34. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31.
38. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (internal quotation marks omitted) (paraphrasing Duncan and quoting Glucksberg, respectively).
39. For a discussion of Justice Stevens’ proposed alternative, see infra Part IV.
40. Duncan was a criminal procedure case, and it might be read as confined to that context, 391 U.S. at 161–62. The language that Justice Alito cites in McDonald (and tellingly does not quote) specifically deals with the issue of a fair trial, 130 S. Ct. at 3032. Alito is right, however, that Duncan’s approach is broadly consistent with the decisions in the selective incorporation cases that are still good law, both in the criminal procedure context and in other areas, such as free speech. Id. at 3034–37.

The invocation of Glucksberg raises a different question. The approach taken in that case,
Applying this test to the Second Amendment is quite straightforward. As Alito notes, *Heller* had already collected a mass of historical evidence showing that the right to arms, like the right to self-defense that it serves, is very deeply rooted in America’s history and tradition. Then, however, Alito goes on to suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to incorporate the Second Amendment. Taking this step is somewhat odd, both because it is not required by the *Duncan/Glucksberg* test, and because the Court has rarely, if ever, treated evidence of the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment as a significant factor in substantive due process or selective incorporation cases.

Alito must have taken this novel and unnecessary step in order to suggest that fidelity to precedent leads in this case to the same result as originalism. He is certainly right that a decision consistent both with precedent and with originalism rests on a stronger foundation than a decision that must reject one or the other. Alito’s opinion thus suggests that *McDonald* required the Court to make no hard choices or to exercise any kind of discretion that might constitute judicial activism.

### B. Originalism

Unfortunately, Alito’s effort to marry respect for precedent with an originalist inquiry leads him into some difficulties. Perhaps most obviously, he cites no evidence about the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. And for good reason. If an originalist case can be made for incorporation, it has to be based on the Privileges or Immunities Clause, which Alito has already refused to consider.

Taken by itself, this may not be particularly troubling. Alito seems implicitly to argue that even if the Court picked the wrong clause to justify its doctrine of selective incorporation, the fact remains that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect the Second Amendment right against state action. To put it another way, even if the Court’s approach has been questionable as a formal matter, the outcome is substantively correct under originalism, and that agreement is what is most important. Why engage in a disruptive spring cleaning of a century’s worth of case law, only to reach which rejected the claim that the right to assisted suicide is protected by due process, is completely inconsistent with a subsequent decision, *Lawrence v. Texas*, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which recognized a right to engage in sodomy under substantive due process. *Compare Glucksberg*, 521 U.S. at 719–29, *with Lawrence*, 539 U.S. at 564–69. *Lawrence* made no effort to reconcile its holding with the *Glucksberg* test—and indeed did not even mention *Glucksberg*—but neither did *Lawrence* propose any alternative general test of fundamentality under substantive due process. *Lawrence* is probably best seen as the latest in a line of *su i generis* sexual freedom cases—a line that includes *Griswold v. Connecticut*, 381 U.S. 479 (1963), and *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)—and Alito’s decision to rely on *Glucksberg* is therefore quite reasonable. For further discussion of the relation between *Glucksberg* and *Lawrence*, see Lund & McGinnis, *supra* note 27, at 1607–11.

41. *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3036, 3038–42.

42. Alito never quite says that the Fourteenth Amendment was specifically designed to incorporate the Second Amendment, or that his arguments about the intent of the 39th Congress provide an adequate and independent ground for the Court’s incorporation holding, but the arguments he presents can hardly have any other purpose than to create that impression.
the same result under a different clause of the same constitutional provision? 43

What is troubling is that the evidence Alito presents actually points away from incorporation. He relies primarily on two related statutes, the Freedmen’s Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act, both enacted in 1866. 44 These are excellent sources of evidence because there is no doubt that a major purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to put the Civil Rights Act beyond constitutional challenge. 45 These statutes, moreover, are more reliable evidence of congressional intent (and arguably of the public’s understanding, as well) than statements by individual legislators. 46 These Acts contain specific and precise language approved by overwhelming majorities in the 39th Congress.

The difficulty arises from the fact that the relevant provisions of both statutes were antidiscrimination provisions, not generalized substantive protections of any federal rights.

Section 14 of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, for example, applied only to those parts of the defeated Confederacy where “the ordinary course of judicial proceedings” was not yet operating or where “constitutional relations to the [federal] government” had not yet been restored. 47 Consistent with this geographic limitation, the statute provides for military enforcement of certain basic civil rights:

[T]he right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens [of the limited geographic areas where the statute applies] without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery. 48

It is true, as Alito stresses, that this provision assumes the existence of “the constitutional right to bear arms.” But the statute also assumes the existence of several other “laws and proceedings” without implying that any of them is derived from or defined by federal law or the federal

43. See Lund & McGinnis, supra note 27, at 1609 (making the same point).
45. Both statutes were enacted over the veto of President Andrew Johnson, who believed that the Civil Rights Act went beyond congressional authority. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1680, 3838 (1866). At the very least, Johnson’s constitutional argument was sufficiently plausible that supporters of the Civil Rights Act could reasonably have feared that the courts might agree with him.
46. Alito also quotes a variety of individual legislators, but none of the quotations articulates the incorporation thesis. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3041 & n.25.
47. 14 Stat. 173, 176 (1866).
48. Id. at 176–77 (emphasis added).
Constitution. Rather, the right to bear arms is given as an example of a larger set of matters that were at that time almost exclusively determined by state law (including state constitutions), and it requires only that all citizens be given the “full and equal benefit of all [such] laws and proceedings . . . without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery.”

Read as a whole, § 14 is clearly aimed at ensuring that black citizens get treated the same as white citizens with respect to a wide array of widely accepted rights, and it is easy to understand why Congress would have been especially concerned to prevent the selective disarming of freedmen in the southern states where this statute was operative. But the content and contours of those rights, including the constitutional right to bear arms, were at that time determined by state law. Section 14 does not purport to specify or alter the effects of those determinations (other than by forbidding racial discrimination). Nor does § 14 imply that Congress believed it was enforcing the Second Amendment against the states or was requiring the states to conform their laws with the Second Amendment.

Section 14 is a perfectly good piece of evidence to support Alito’s argument that the right to arms meets the Duncan/Glucksberg test under substantive due process, but it does not even suggest that the 39th Congress meant to make the Second Amendment applicable to the states, either through the Freedmen’s Bureau Act itself or through the subsequently enacted Fourteenth Amendment.

The same problem afflicts Alito’s interpretation of the broader and more famous Civil Rights Act of 1866, which was adopted a few months before the Freedmen’s Bureau Act. Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act, like § 14 of the Freedmen’s Bureau statute, was an antidiscrimination statute that forbade the states from engaging in racial discrimination when granting or enforcing a wide range of state law rights. Alito is probably correct that

49. Id.
50. Alito quotes only part of this provision. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3040.
51. In 1868, 60% of American states (and 73% of southern states) had state constitutional provisions expressly protecting the right to arms, and several of the remaining states had provisions expressly protecting the right to defend life, liberty, and property, which may have entailed the right to arms. Steven G. Calabresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions when the Fourteenth Amendment Was Ratified in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 87 TEX. L. REV. 7, 50–52 (2008). In states that lacked such provisions, courts might have held that a constitutional right to arms was implied in other provisions or by principles of general constitutional law if a legislature had ever taken the unprecedented step of banning the private possession or use of firearms.
52. Section 1 of the statute provided that:

[All persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
this would have been understood to include the right to arms, which many states had expressly protected in their own constitutions and which no state, to my knowledge, had ever claimed was unprotected as a matter of state constitutional law.\textsuperscript{53} Once again, this offers support for the proposition that the right is deeply rooted in our nation’s history and traditions. But Alito is quite mistaken when he asserts that “[t]he unavoidable conclusion is that the Civil Rights Act, like the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, aimed to protect ‘the constitutional right to bear arms’ and not simply to prohibit discrimination.”\textsuperscript{54} The unavoidable conclusion is precisely the opposite. The language of the statute guarantees to all citizens the “full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”\textsuperscript{55} Nothing in § 1 of the Civil Rights Act purports to specify what legal benefits are or must be enjoyed by white citizens, or even suggests that its aim is anything more than “simply to prohibit discrimination.”

As Professor Jack Balkin has pointed out, § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is still in effect today.\textsuperscript{56} If it is “unavoidably” interpreted to give general substantive protection to “the constitutional right to bear arms,” which is not even mentioned in that statute, it is pretty hard to see how one could avoid interpreting it to do the same for other constitutional rights, including, at a minimum, the other rights listed in the Bill of Rights.\textsuperscript{57} Given the undisputed fact that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant primarily, though perhaps not exclusively, to put this statute on an unquestionable constitutional foundation, § 1 of the Civil Rights Act (as re-adopted after the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted) is a valid

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convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, to the contrary notwithstanding.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{53} The fact that the constitutional right to arms was not mentioned in this statute, but was specifically listed a few months later in the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, presumably reflects the fact that the selective disarmament of blacks was regarded as an especially pressing problem in the jurisdictions covered by the latter statute.

\textsuperscript{54} \textit{McDonald}, 130 S. Ct. at 3040–41 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{55} 14 Stat. 27, 27 (emphasis added).


\textsuperscript{57} Alito apparently thinks his conclusion is unavoidable because the right to bear arms was specifically mentioned in § 14 of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act, though not in the Civil Rights Act itself. But nothing in the language or structure of § 14 so much as suggests that the constitutional right to bear arms is the only constitutional right protected by that statute. Suppose, for example, that a state had passed a statute forbidding blacks to worship God or express political opinions. No one would think that this would have been permitted by § 14.
exercise of congressional authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. As that statutory provision is interpreted by Alito, it seems to follow almost inexorably that Congress has protected all of the individual rights in the Bill of Rights against state action, including those that the Court has expressly refused to incorporate under substantive due process.

Balkin sketches several arguments that might be used to wriggle out of this conclusion and rightly suggests that they are unconvincing. For our purposes here, the most serious problem with Alito’s argument is that his interpretation of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act (apart from its violently implausible reading of the text) is inconsistent with the Court’s own longstanding interpretation of the statute. In his effort to marry respect for the Court’s substantive due process precedents with the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, Alito got so carried away that he disregarded the Court’s statutory precedents.

The Court frequently says that stare decisis has even stronger force in statutory cases than in constitutional cases. Alito’s novel misinterpretation of the Civil Rights Act was almost certainly inadvertent, and the chances that the Court will adopt it in a statutory construction case are nil. Still, Alito’s misstep is a tribute to the deep appeal of originalism. In an opinion that consciously stresses the virtue of fidelity to precedent, the gravitational force of originalism seems to have dragged the author unwittingly into committing an aggravated form of the very kind of adventurism he was trying to avoid.

As the preceding discussion may suggest, it is possible to argue that the Privileges or Immunities Clause itself—like § 14 of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act and § 1 of the Civil Rights Act—is an antidiscrimination provision rather than a general guarantee of federally defined substantive rights. Justice Stephen Field suggested this interpretation in his dissenting opinion in Slaughter-House, and a number of distinguished scholars have shown that the Clause can reasonably be read as a guarantee of equality.

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58. The Court has issued decisions on whether particular forms of discrimination are racial discrimination within the meaning of the statute, without ever suggesting that § 1981 protects against anything other than racial discrimination. See, e.g., Saint Francis Coll. v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–85 (1976). The notion that the statute “incorporates” provisions of the Bill of Rights would be particularly strange in light of the fact that the Court has interpreted § 1981 to apply to private behavior. See, e.g., Runyon v. McCrory, 427 U.S. 160, 179 (1976). Runyon itself is implausible enough as an interpretation of the statute. If § 1981 were also read to incorporate the Bill of Rights against private behavior as well as against governments, we would certainly enter a rather bizarre new legal world.

59. E.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (“Considerations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.”). Patterson itself arose under § 1981.

60. 83 U.S. 36, 95–101 (1873) (Field, J., dissenting).

Not surprisingly, the *McDonald* respondents sought to enlist this interpretation in defense of nondiscriminatory handgun bans.\(^{52}\)

Alito could simply have dismissed this argument on the same rationale that he used to dismiss the petitioner’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Both positions are inconsistent with well-settled precedent. Instead, his opinion rejects the antidiscrimination argument as implausible on five grounds, all of which are themselves implausible as a matter of original meaning.

First, Alito points out that this interpretation would mean either (1) that the Fourteenth Amendment permits the states to engage in nondiscriminatory abridgements of various other rights in the Bill of Rights; or (2) that the Second Amendment should be singled out for anomalously unfavorable treatment.\(^{63}\) That is certainly a powerful argument in terms of fidelity to precedent, and is quite consistent with the opinion’s earlier insistence that the right to arms meets the *Duncan/Glucksberg* test for incorporation, but it is no refutation of the antidiscrimination interpretation of the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.\(^{64}\)

Second, Alito points again to § 14 of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act and concludes that “[i]t would have been nonsensical for Congress to guarantee the full and equal benefit of a constitutional right that does not exist.”\(^{65}\) For the reasons set out above, this refutation of the respondents’ argument is based on the fallacious assumption that the constitutional right referred to in the statute must have been a *federal* constitutional right.

Third, Alito notes that a mere rule of nondiscrimination would have been less effective in protecting freedmen during Reconstruction because it would have permitted southern governments to disarm the general population while allowing state militias and state peace officers to oppress black citizens.\(^{66}\) Leaving aside the fanciful supposition that Reconstruction-era southern whites might have voted to surrender their own right to the private possession and use of guns, Congress enacted numerous statutes that sought to curtail the oppression of blacks by state governments. None of those statutes did everything that could possibly be done to accomplish that goal, and the truly implausible interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is that it invalidated *ex proprio vigore* any and all

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*the Privileges or Immunities Clause,* 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1387–88 (1992). There are disagreements among these commentators about the exact scope and effect of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, and they do not all purport to reach firm conclusions.


63. *Id.* at 3043.

64. The Equal Protection Clause is obviously an antidiscrimination provision, and the Due Process Clause can also be understood in large part as a safeguard against certain kinds of discrimination, such as arbitrary actions by the executive and legislation that lacks the generality implied by the term “law.” For a discussion of the difficulties entailed in the notion that the Due Process Clause was originally meant to effectuate incorporation, see the discussion of Stevens’s opinion *infra* Part IV.

65. *McDonald,* 130 S. Ct. at 3043.

66. *Id.*
laws that might have left Reconstruction-era freedmen with less than perfect protection against white oppression.\footnote{Anyone who thinks this is a plausible interpretation should read § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, along with the Fifteenth Amendment.}

Fourth, Alito notes that laws forbidding racial discrimination in connection with bearing arms would not have prevented southern governments from disarming supporters of black rights, which would have included some whites as well as most blacks. That is a good reason for suspecting that Congress might have been well-advised to go beyond banning racial discrimination in the Civil Rights Act, but it does not show that this statute or the Fourteenth Amendment did so. In any event, an antidiscrimination interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment need not be limited to racial discrimination, so a law disarming supporters of black rights might be unconstitutional even under that interpretation.

Fifth—and this is the most shocking argument of them all—Alito points out that the 39th Congress balked at a proposal to disarm the white militiamen who were abusing and oppressing the newly freed slaves, deciding instead simply to disband the militias without disarming their members.\footnote{\textit{McDonald}, 130 S. Ct. at 3043.} This is a justly famous example of the understanding in Congress that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and bear arms from infringement by the federal government. But it is utterly irrelevant to the issue Alito is addressing, which is whether the 39th Congress meant to impose the Second Amendment on the states.

Once again, Alito’s effort to marshal originalist evidence to reinforce his \textit{Duncan/Glucksberg} analysis leads him to make plainly untenable arguments. This is regrettable because the evidence supporting his substantive due process analysis is overwhelmingly powerful. The evidence had already been adequately presented in \textit{Heller}, and Alito had adequately summarized it earlier on in his opinion. He might have left it at that, but he chose instead to gild the lily with patently fallacious arguments about the intent of the 39th Congress.

None of this criticism of Alito’s opinion implies that the Fourteenth Amendment in general, or the Privileges or Immunities Clause in particular, can only be interpreted as an antidiscrimination provision. But a serious originalist argument in favor of Second Amendment incorporation cannot be found in that opinion.\footnote{Justice Thomas’s concurrence does present a serious argument, to which we will turn later in this Article. See \textit{infra} Part III.}

\section*{C. Activist Dicta}

Alito’s effort to introduce an element of originalism into his analysis will probably be of little interest except to a few academics. Far more important, as a practical matter, is his unrestrained deference to a series of dicta in the Court’s \textit{Heller} opinion:

\begin{quote}
We made it clear in \textit{Heller} that our holding did not cast
\end{quote}
doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill,” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” We repeat those assurances here.70

This repetition of Heller’s “assurances” is unnecessary and irresponsible. These three dicta, which will probably be treated by most lower courts as though they are the law, were casually tossed off by Justice Scalia in the Heller majority opinion. They had no basis in prior Supreme Court case law and they were not supported by evidence of the original meaning of the Second Amendment.71 Their reappearance in Alito’s McDonald opinion is the single largest obstacle to regarding that opinion as a sound model of judicial restraint.

Heller correctly characterized the right to keep and bear arms as one that pre-existed the Second Amendment.72 More dubiously, the Court suggested that the scope and nature of the right can be discovered through a historical inquiry. Although Heller did not purport to provide an “exhaustive historical analysis,”73 the opinion pretty clearly implied that the three limitations reaffirmed by Alito have a solid historical grounding. This tantalizing originalist garb resembles the emperor’s new clothes in Hans Christian Andersen’s story.

Consider the first dictum: “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill . . . .”74 This sounds intuitively obvious, at least at first. But how “longstanding” are these prohibitions? Scalia either did not know, or decided not to tell us in Heller. Apparently, however, the first general ban on the possession of firearms by felons was enacted in 1968.75

70. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008)).
73. Id. at 2816.
74. Id. at 2816–17. In a footnote to the sentence containing this dictum and the dicta about sensitive places and commercial sales discussed below, the Heller Court stated, “We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive.” Id. at 2817 n.26. The Court did not say how strong the presumption was, but the opinion later referred to these restrictions as “regulations of the right that we describe as permissible,” and called them “the exceptions we have mentioned.” Id. at 2821. And, at the very end of the opinion, the Court flatly declared: “The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating [the problem of handgun violence], including some measures regulating handguns . . . .” Id. at 2822 (citing the page on which the Court had earlier endorsed the three Second Amendment exceptions). All of this suggests that the presumption is very strong indeed, if it can be overcome at all.
This was 177 years after the adoption of the Second Amendment and less than a decade before the District of Columbia handgun ban was enacted.

Aside from the absence of historical support for the claim that such prohibitions are consistent with the preexisting right to arms, they are inconsistent with what *Heller* itself called its “core,” namely self-defense. *Heller*’s dictum allows legislatures to leave American citizens defenseless in their own homes for the rest of their lives on the basis of nothing more than a nonviolent felony like tax evasion or insider trading. It would make more sense to say that the government may *silence* these felons for the rest of their lives—regulatory crimes, after all, usually involve an abuse of speech, such as making false statements or negotiating contracts that the government forbids. Such regulatory crimes have nothing at all to do with violence or the use of firearms.

*Heller* next endorsed prohibitions on “the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings.” Scalia provided no evidence that this limitation was part of the preexisting right that he believes was codified in the Second Amendment in 1791. Nor did he explain what makes these particular places “sensitive,” or how courts are supposed to go about determining the scope of this newly announced exception to the right to arms.

Is a university campus more “sensitive” than a shopping mall across the street? Is a government-owned cabin in a national forest more “sensitive” than a privately owned hotel on a public road? Did the whole city of New Orleans become a “sensitive” place after Hurricane Katrina, thus justifying the government in forcibly disarming law-abiding citizens whom the government was unable to protect from roving bands of criminals?

Maybe this dictum about sensitive places simply means that judges will decide whether the costs of allowing citizens to take their guns to certain places exceed the benefits. If so, it is not easy to see the difference between this approach and the Breyer cost/benefit analysis that Scalia ridiculed with the following observation:

> The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of

felons apparently were not adopted until well into the 20th Century. See id. at 707–08. It might be possible to interpret the sentence from *Heller* quoted in the text to refer only to those felon-in-possession laws that are in fact “longstanding,” and perhaps a court determined to read the dictum narrowly might adopt such an interpretation. That is, however, a highly unnatural reading of the sentence, and such a court would still be left to wonder how long a particular felon-in-possession law has to have been in existence to be “longstanding.”


77. This point is so completely obvious and so plainly significant that some lower courts may be unwilling to treat this dictum from *Heller* as though it is the law. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 616 F.3d 685, 693 (7th Cir. 2010).

78. *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. at 2817.

79. *See generally* Stephen P. Halbrook, “*Only Law Enforcement Will Be Allowed to Have Guns*”: *Hurricane Katrina and the New Orleans Firearm Confiscations*, 18 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 339 (2008) (discussing the aftermath of a police decision that only law enforcement officers would be allowed to possess guns in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina struck the area).
government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.\textsuperscript{80}

The \textit{Heller} majority next endorsed “laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”\textsuperscript{81} Once again, Scalia presented no historical evidence about the nature or even existence of pre-1791 commercial regulations. Nor did he suggest any limit on the government’s power to impose “conditions and qualifications” on these commercial transactions. For all we are told, Congress could place a prohibitively high tax on the sale of firearms or create burdensome regulatory obstacles that would make it impractical for a commercial market to exist. If the Court meant that it would approve only reasonable conditions and qualifications, it failed to say so, and it suggested no criteria by which reasonable restrictions could be distinguished from unreasonable restrictions.

The \textit{Heller} Court introduced the three Second Amendment exceptions just discussed with the unimpeachable observation that the right protected by the Second Amendment is not unlimited, and with the historical claim that “the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”\textsuperscript{82} This appears to be an endorsement of yet another exception to the constitutional right (though it is not one that Alito’s \textit{McDonald} opinion expressly reaffirms).

Scalia provided no evidence of any such prohibitions prior to 1791, and the 19th Century cases do not provide direct evidence of the scope of the preexisting right. Nor did Scalia explain why or to what extent judicial decisions under state analogues of the Second Amendment would be relevant to the original meaning of the Second Amendment. Nor did he provide arguments to support his apparent assumption that the 19th Century state cases were correctly decided. Perhaps the “exhaustive historical analysis” to which Scalia alluded\textsuperscript{83} will someday provide good answers to some of these questions. The early leading cases, however, as well as the two state cases Scalia actually cited, affirmatively undermine his claim.\textsuperscript{84}

In some American jurisdictions today, openly carrying a firearm might plausibly be thought to violate the ancient common law prohibition against “terrifying the good people of the land” by going about with dangerous and unusual weapons.\textsuperscript{85} If courts were to conclude that open carry violates this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{80} \textit{Heller}, 128 S. Ct. at 2821 (emphasis in original). There is one difference between Scalia’s approach and Breyer’s: Breyer goes to the trouble of actually conducting an analysis.
\item \textsuperscript{81} \textit{Id.} at 2817.
\item \textsuperscript{82} \textit{Id.} at 2816.
\item \textsuperscript{83} \textit{Id.}
\item \textsuperscript{84} For a detailed analysis of this issue, see Lund, \textit{supra} note 71, at 1359–62.
\item \textsuperscript{85} 4 \textsc{William Blackstone}, Commentaries *149.
\end{itemize}
common law prohibition (and thus is not within the preexisting right protected by the Second Amendment), after Heller and McDonald have effectively decreed that bans on concealed carry are per se valid, the constitutional right to bear arms would effectively cease to exist.

We do not yet know how the courts will rule on laws that forbid both open and concealed carry of firearms. Nor do we know what the term “sensitive places” will turn out to mean or what kinds of commercial regulations will be upheld. A myriad of other future regulations will also be tested in the courts, including new regulations aimed at frustrating the exercise even of the narrow right to keep a handgun in the home for self-defense.88 What we do know is that Heller and McDonald noisily provided “assurances” about the legality of a broad range of limits on the right to arms, without performing a genuinely legal analysis of the legal issues.87

This, too, is a kind of judicial restraint. It might be called the restraint of the political operator.88 It is no secret that gun control has been a very contentious political issue for many decades now, with emotions running high on both sides of the policy debate. Heller and McDonald gave victories to one side of that debate. What could be more politic than to reassure those on the other side that they too can expect many victories, and perhaps even hope that the right to keep a handgun in the home will turn out to be the only right that is protected? Whatever may be the value of this kind of politically soothing commentary, it contradicts what is perhaps the Supreme Court’s most frequently articulated principle of judicial restraint, namely that constitutional questions should not be decided except when actually presented in a case.89


87. Heller also articulated a “common use” test under which many weapons will be treated as per se outside the scope of the Second Amendment. This test was presented as one with a basis both in originalism and in Supreme Court precedent. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2817. Both claims are false. See Lund, supra note 71, at 1362–67; Nelson Lund, Heller and Second Amendment Precedent, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335 (2009) (discussing the Heller Court’s analysis of United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939)).

88. In some cases, statements that are technically dicta might be justified by the Court’s obligation to provide clear guidance to the inferior courts. Cf. Chad M. Oldfather, Remedy ing Judicial Inactivity: Opinions as Informational Regulation, 58 FLA. L. REV. 743, 779–89 (2006) (analyzing appellate opinions as mechanisms for “informational regulation” of overburdened judicial dockets). Heller’s dicta, however, are opaque at best, and in some cases they make the Court’s opinion internally inconsistent. This is not how one provides clear guidance.

89. Among countless examples, see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 805–06 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, J.J.) (“Our precedents have long counseled us to avoid deciding such hypothetical questions of constitutional law. This is a fundamental rule of judicial restraint.”) (internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
III. RESTRAINED ORIGINALISM: JUSTICE THOMAS’S CONCURRENCE

Justice Thomas’s concurrence in *McDonald* offers a sharp contrast with Alito’s plurality opinion, and it will no doubt strike many observers as an outburst of judicial activism. Thomas dismisses a gigantic body of substantive due process case law, which he calls a “legal fiction” that does not even have a guiding principle to distinguish between rights it protects and those that it does not protect. He then undertakes his own extended inquiry into the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, concluding that the evidence “overwhelmingly demonstrates that the privileges and immunities of [United States] citizens included individual rights enumerated in the Constitution, including the right to keep and bear arms.”

Much of the evidence that Thomas presents also supports the plurality’s conclusion that the right to arms meets the *Duncan/Glucksberg* test of “fundamental” rights, and he joins the part of Alito’s opinion that summarizes that evidence. Thomas, however, goes into much more detail about the legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment. One reason for this more extended historical exegesis is that his inquiry is focused on determining what ordinary citizens at the time of ratification (not just the members of the 39th Congress) would have understood the Privileges or Immunities Clause to mean. *Heller* had purported to engage in the same kind of inquiry with respect to the Second Amendment itself, but that was a case in which there were virtually no relevant precedents. Public meaning originalism is a perfectly respectable interpretive approach in cases of first impression like *Heller*, but it is also one that the Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected in its selective incorporation decisions.

Thomas candidly acknowledges that the record of the congressional debates is “less than crystal clear.” Several members, for example, made

91. *Id.* at 3075 (plurality opinion). That part of Alito’s opinion includes the discussions of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 criticized above. *See supra* notes 48–59 and accompanying text.
92. *Id.* at 3072.
93. Thomas quotes *Heller*’s remark that constitutional provisions “are written to be understood by the voters.” *Id.* at 3063 (quoting District of Columbia v. *Heller*, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2788 (2008)). The quotation is accurate. Whether *Heller* was a successful exercise in public meaning originalism is a separate matter. *See generally* Lund, *supra* note 71 (critiquing the Court’s use of originalism arguments in *Heller*).
94. Even the *Heller* dissenters agreed that the case should be decided on the basis of the “the text of the Amendment [and] the arguments advanced by its proponents.” 128 S. Ct. at 2822 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Indeed, one might say that the Court has *always* rejected this approach in its incorporation cases, at least implicitly. But it has also rejected the approach more openly, most notably in its refusal to consider the historical argument presented in Justice Hugo Black’s dissent in *Adamson v. California*, 332 U.S. 46, 74–75, 92–120 (1947).
96. *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3075.
statements consistent with the view that the Privileges or Immunities Clause is an antidiscrimination provision that was meant to operate by analogy to the similarly worded Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV. For that reason, Thomas attributes special significance to evidence that widely publicized statements by congressional proponents of the Fourteenth Amendment “point unambiguously” to the conclusion that the Privileges or Immunities Clause substantively enforces at least the fundamental rights enumerated in the Constitution, including the right protected by the Second Amendment.97

Some of the historical evidence about the publicity given to these statements has only recently been unearthed. It is too soon to say whether dispassionate students of the entire historical record will reach a consensus that agrees with Thomas’s conclusions.98 On its face and taken as a whole, however, his detailed exposition is at least plausible, and none of the other opinions in McDonald makes the slightest effort to refute his findings. That said, there are some obvious weak links even on the face of Thomas’s analysis.

First, like the plurality, Thomas seeks to enlist the Freedmen’s Bureau and Civil Rights Acts of 1866 in support of Second Amendment incorporation.99 This is a mistake, for the reasons set out above.

Second, some of the quotations that Thomas offers in support of the incorporation thesis are at least equally compatible with the nondiscrimination thesis. For example, he invokes the following statement from the Senate Report of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction: “[A]dequate security for future peace and safety . . . can only be found in such changes of the organic law as shall determine the civil rights and privileges of all citizens in all parts of the republic.”100 This does not necessarily imply that the law must “determine” these rights by making them substantively uniform throughout the nation.

Thomas also quotes one participant in a floor debate in Congress a few years after the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, who said that the country “gave the most grand of all these rights, privileges, and immunities [listed in the Bill of Rights], by one single amendment to the Constitution, to four millions of American citizens,” namely the freedmen who had previously had no rights under the law.101 Since virtually all the rights listed in the Bill of Rights were already widely protected by state law, this

97. Id.
98. Anyone who assumes that Thomas’s evidence about the original public meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause clearly confirms the incorporation thesis should take a careful look at Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1557870 (providing detailed evidence that the Clause was an attempt to resolve a longstanding national dispute about the rights of free blacks under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV).
99. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3075.
100. Id. at 3071 (quoting REP. OF THE JOINT COMM. ON RECONSTRUCTION, S. REP. MP. 112, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1866)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at 3075 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 475–76 (1871)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
specific reference to the freedmen is compatible with the nondiscrimination interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause (especially when one takes account of the imprecision typical of political speeches).

Similarly, another participant in the same debate said that the Bill of Rights “and some provisions of the Constitution of like import embrace the ‘privileges and immunities’ of citizenship as set forth in article 4, section 2 of the Constitution and in the fourteenth amendment.”102 The speaker’s pairing of Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause with the Fourteenth Amendment points more strongly toward the antidiscrimination thesis than toward the incorporation thesis.

Thomas notes that the Civil Rights Act of 1871 “prohibits state officials from depriving citizens of ‘any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.’”103 This statutory provision is quite consistent with the proposition that the Privileges or Immunities Clause simply secures the right to equal treatment, by analogy with Article IV’s requirement that the “Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”104

Third, Thomas notes that President Andrew Johnson and several southern governors proposed to replace § 1 of the proposed Fourteenth Amendment with a version more closely modeled on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.105 It is true that this could mean that they believed that the text actually adopted prohibited more than discrimination, but it could just as easily mean that they simply regarded that language as too easily subject to misinterpretation.

Finally, Thomas points out that many people believed that § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was superfluous because the Thirteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866 had already accomplished its goal.106 That fact affirmatively supports the nondiscrimination interpretation of § 1 and undermines the incorporation interpretation.

Perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment’s vague language and variegated legislative history will never yield a fully satisfying or conclusive answer to basic questions about its original meaning. Even so, as a foundation for incorporation doctrine, Thomas’s position is manifestly far superior to the unexplained (and apparently unexplainable) notion that the Court’s selective incorporation doctrine can be derived from the original meaning of the Due Process Clause. But that leaves open the question whether Thomas’s foray into originalism, even assuming that it is the best available reading of text and history, should be characterized as judicial activism.

Thomas himself anticipates this question, and answers it by presenting a model of judicial restraint that is quite different from the model implicitly

102. Id. at 3076 (emphasis added by Thomas) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
105. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3078.
106. Id. at 3079.
relied on in Alito’s plurality opinion. Stare decisis, as Thomas rightly points out, has never been considered an “inexorable command.” The Court frequently finds that it should overrule or disregard a prior decision or line of decisions. The Court’s most recent effort to articulate a coherent explanation of its approach to stare decisis came in a list of factors set out in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, but Thomas only quotes a dictum from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist’s partial dissent in that case. Thomas does not try to justify his approach in McDonald using the Casey factors, and this is no accident. None of those factors would justify overruling the large and well-settled body of selective incorporation precedent:

• That body of case law has certainly not “come to be seen so clearly as error that its enforcement [is] for that very reason doomed.”

• Nor have these precedents “proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability.”

• The rules adopted in these cases are at least arguably “subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation.”

• And “related principles of law” have not “so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of abandoned doctrine.”

• Finally, it is not the case that “facts have so changed, or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.”

Rather than follow the Casey scheme, Thomas repairs to a much older understanding of judicial restraint. Perhaps the deepest enduring feature of

107. Id. at 3063 (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3063.
110. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 855.
114. Id.
our common law tradition is that every court is obliged to apply the law correctly to the particular case it is deciding. That one simple rule—reflected in our practice of identifying decisions by the names of the parties to the case—is related to many oft-repeated principles associated with the ideal of judicial restraint. These principles include the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III and the related proscription against advisory opinions, as well as the distinction between binding holdings and obiter dicta. In addition, Alexander Hamilton implicitly relied on the traditional rule when he assured our young nation that the judiciary would necessarily be “the least dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution.”

Whatever the accuracy of Hamilton’s prediction, it rested on an ancient and vital understanding of proper judicial behavior, one that modern courts have seldom dared to openly repudiate.

Of course, the venerable obligation of courts to decide every case correctly according to the law does not provide any information about what law applies in any particular case. More specifically, it does not tell courts what they should do in case of a conflict between the original meaning of a written law and the interpretation adopted in that court’s precedents. Thomas agrees with the plurality that a large volume of precedents rest on the substantive due process framework and that stare decisis is important to the stability of our legal system. In his view, however, the crucial fact is that there are no substantive due process precedents applicable to the specific Second Amendment incorporation question presented by the McDonald case itself. For that reason, Thomas maintains that this large body of precedent is no obstacle to resolving this case on other grounds, at least so long as the result is the same as it would be under substantive due process. Doing so would create no direct conflict with any substantive due process precedents, all of which would remain untouched.

On this point, Thomas is indubitably correct. He also recognizes, of course, that taking his approach in this case could raise questions in future cases that would not be raised under the plurality’s approach. His

115. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
117. For historical evidence that Article III implies that courts owe prior judicial decisions some measure of deference (though perhaps not nearly so much as they customarily receive today), see John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Reconciling Originalism and Precedent, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 803 (2009), and Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV. 1 (2001).
118. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062.
119. As far as I know, this approach to Second Amendment incorporation was first suggested in Kenneth A. Klukowski, Citizen Gun Rights: Incorporating the Second Amendment Through the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 39 N.M. L. REV. 195, 260 (2009). Klukowski filed a brief in the McDonald case making the same point. Brief for the American Civil Rights Union et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 34–35, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (No. 08-1521) [hereinafter Brief for the American Civil Rights Union].
120. Perhaps the most obvious question is what gun rights non-citizens would have. Whereas
straightforward response—which offers a striking contrast with the plurality’s legally gratuitous reaffirmation of *Heller*’s legally gratuitous dicta—is a refusal to consider hypothetical cases that are not before the Court. This is the essence of the model of judicial restraint adopted by Thomas in his concurrence.

So much for substantive due process. With respect to the Privileges or Immunities Clause, Thomas does have some difficult precedents with which to deal. At oral argument in *McDonald*, the first comment came from Chief Justice John Roberts, who said that petitioners’ “argument is contrary to the Slaughter-House Cases, which have been the law for 140 years. It might be simpler, but it’s a big—it’s a heavy burden for you to carry to suggest that we ought to overrule that decision.” Justice Scalia soon followed up by mocking the lawyer for pressing an argument that is “the darling of the professoriate, for sure,” and even suggested that the lawyer was “bucking for a place on some law school faculty.” Instead, the lawyer should have been content to argue substantive due process, “[w]hich, as much as I think it’s wrong, I have—even I have acquiesced in it.”

Justice Thomas, who is hardly a darling of the professoriate for sure, did not think that Justice Scalia’s acquiescence settled the issue. Like the petitioners’ lawyer and nearly all academic commentators, Thomas indicates that he is not persuaded by the *Slaughter-House* majority opinion. Consistent with his model of judicial restraint, however, he notes that the Due Process Clause protects all “persons,” the text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause restricts its coverage to “citizens.”

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122. *Id.* at 7. This would seem to be the ultimate judicial put-down, suggesting as it does that the advocate is not a real lawyer.

123. *Id.* I think Scalia was right to suggest that petitioners’ effort to persuade five members of the current Court to overrule *Slaughter-House* was a quixotic undertaking. Ridiculing the lawyer for making an original-meaning argument that was far from frivolous, however, was not a display of anything that could be called judicial restraint, especially coming from a Justice who has spent much of his career promoting the very interpretative approach on which the lawyer was relying. Apparently, Justice Scalia thinks that originalism is the only proper approach to constitutional interpretation by judges, except when *he* has rejected it, at which point it becomes an exercise in academic silliness.

Thomas, who rarely speaks at oral argument, has offered the following comment about the behavior of some of his colleagues: “So why do you beat up on people [i.e., advocates at oral argument] if you already know [what you think the answer is]? I don’t know, because I don’t beat up on ‘em. I refuse to participate. I don’t like it, so I don’t do it.” Jay Reeves, *Clarence Thomas to Fellow Justices: Hush!*, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, Ala.), Oct. 24, 2009, at B5, available at 2009 WLNR 21853769. This may be the most underappreciated form of judicial restraint in our current era.

opinion can be read to leave the incorporation issue unresolved.\(^\text{125}\) Accordingly, he declines to consider whether the Privileges or Immunities Clause protects any unenumerated rights and he declines to consider whether the judgment in Slaughter-House was correct.\(^\text{126}\)

Thomas nonetheless firmly rejects the central analytic point in the Slaughter-House opinion, namely that the rights of federal citizenship and of state citizenship are mutually exclusive categories.\(^\text{127}\) This point led the Court to conclude in United States v. Cruikshank that the right to keep and bear arms is not protected by the Privileges or Immunities Clause because it is a right of state citizenship that predated the federal Constitution.\(^\text{128}\) Thomas nevertheless maintains that Cruikshank’s interpretation of the Constitution is so inconsistent with the plain evidence of the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause that the case is not entitled to any respect as precedent.\(^\text{129}\)

This willingness to assign a higher authority to the Constitution than to Cruikshank points to the fundamental difference between Thomas’s approach and that of the plurality. His claim that he is indeed respecting “the importance of stare decisis to the stability of our Nation’s legal system”\(^\text{130}\) rests partly on his certainty that Cruikshank misinterpreted the Constitution (a proposition that no other Justice attempted to refute).\(^\text{131}\) But it is also supported by his refusal to opine on any issues other than the one before the Court in McDonald itself.

Thomas is well aware that his approach to this case, had the Court adopted it, could have had significant effects in future cases. He says, for example, that “this case presents an opportunity to reexamine, and begin


\(^{126}\) McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3085–86. Slaughter-House declined to find an unenumerated right to economic freedom protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.

\(^{127}\) Id.


\(^{129}\) McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3086. Thomas also adds some confirmatory illustrations of the ways in which Cruikshank’s interpretation served to undermine the central goal of the 39th Congress, namely to protect the freedmen and their descendants from white oppression. Id. at 3087.

\(^{130}\) Id. at 3062. Thomas devotes an entire section of his opinion to the issue of stare decisis, giving it far more serious attention than Alito gives to the issue of the Constitution’s original meaning.

\(^{131}\) In Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 51–53 (1947), the Court similarly refused even to address Justice Black’s elaborate historical argument in favor of incorporation through the Privileges or Immunities Clause. For that Court, as for eight of our current Justices, a citation to Slaughter-House and its progeny sufficed.
the process of restoring, the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment agreed upon by those who ratified it.”132 It is easy to imagine that this process might eventually lead the Court to incorporate some provisions of the Bill of Rights that have so far been treated as insufficiently “fundamental.”133 And it is similarly easy to imagine that some decisions recognizing unenumerated rights might one day be overruled.134

But this is just speculation. In this case, which is the only case on which Thomas would have the Court rule, his understanding of the Privileges or Immunities Clause leads to exactly the same result as the plurality’s substantive due process analysis. We do not know how Thomas would rule in a case where those approaches would lead to different results. Suppose, for example, that Thomas’s inquiry into the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause had led him to conclude that Slaughter-House and Cruikshank had correctly interpreted it. Would he then have thought that the Court should refuse to apply the Duncan/Glucksberg test, and rule in favor of Chicago? We don’t know. Nor do we know how he would rule in a right to arms case involving a non-citizen, or how he would rule in an incorporation case involving the Third Amendment or the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.135 Nor, given the emphasis he places on the word “process” in the Due Process Clause, is it clear what his position would be on the incorporation through that Clause of various procedural protections in the Bill of Rights.136

Thomas’s approach in McDonald can be described as restrained originalism. Inherent in our legal system is an enduring tension between

132. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3063 (emphasis added).
133. Even Alito seems to suggest that these precedents may be vulnerable. See id. at 3035 n.13 (plurality opinion) (“Our governing decisions regarding the Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Seventh Amendment’s civil jury requirement long predate the era of selective incorporation.”).
134. See, e.g., id. at 3062 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that Roe v. Wade and Lawrence v. Texas (as well as Lochner v. New York) protected unenumerated rights “without seriously arguing that the [Due Process] Clause was originally understood to protect such rights”); id. at 3084 n.20 (noting that the Establishment Clause “does not purport to protect individual rights” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
135. Some years ago, Thomas joined a dissenting opinion that appeared to assume that the Excessive Fines Clause applies to the states. Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 803 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting). If that dissent made that assumption, Thomas would presumably not consider himself bound by it in a case actually presenting the issue of Excessive Fines Clause incorporation. Statements in dissenting opinions are given no deference under the doctrine of stare decisis. Cf. Craig S. Lerner & Nelson Lund, Judicial Duty and the Supreme Court’s Cult of Celebrity, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1255, 1276–83 (2010) (discussing the tendency of some Justices to consider themselves bound by their own prior statements in concurring and dissenting opinions).
136. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3062 (“The notion that a constitutional provision that guarantees only ‘process’ before a person is deprived of life, liberty, or property could define the substance of those rights strains credulity for even the most casual user of words.”); id. at 3061 (referring to the “procedural protections listed in the first eight Amendments”).
the written Constitution’s claim to be the “supreme Law of the Land” and Article III’s grant of the “judicial Power of the United States” to the federal courts. The original meaning of Article III entailed an understanding of judicial power that included a deep common law tradition of stare decisis, which is in sharp tension with the proposition that precedents must always be ignored when they conflict with the authoritative text of the Constitution. \(139\) The model of judicial restraint adopted in Thomas’s McDonald opinion resolves the tension in this case by respecting another element of the tradition on which Article III rests: the practice of deciding one case at a time and avoiding decisions in hypothetical disputes.

That model is not the kind of grand theory much beloved by academics, and it will not point out a clear path in every case where the Court finds a conflict between the Constitution’s original meaning and its own prior decisions. But it has the great merit of avoiding the plurality opinion’s amalgam of perfectly respectable adherence to precedent with politically convenient dicta and dubious intimations of originalism.

IV. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT AS COMMON LAWYERING: JUSTICE STEVENS’S DISSENT

Thomas restrains his commitment to originalism by recurring to the ancient common law principle that courts decide only the case before them. Justice Stevens puts that restraining principle at the very center of his approach in McDonald, and proposes that the case be decided on the narrowest possible grounds.

As Stevens sees it, the only question presented in this case is whether the Fourteenth Amendment gives individuals the right to possess a handgun for self-protection in the home. He emphasizes that the challenged law allowed residents to keep loaded rifles and shotguns in their homes for self-defense, and he concludes that the facial challenge in this case should fail. \(140\) He acknowledges that there is “real force” to the petitioners’ claim, primarily because of the importance of their interest in defending “life, liberty, and property” and because of the special role that the home has been given in the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases. \(141\)

\(137\) U.S. CONST. art. VI.

\(138\) U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.

\(139\) That tradition, of course, never made an absolute rule of stare decisis, and neither has the Court. For further discussion of the tension between written constitutions and common law modes of reasoning, see Nelson Lund, Montesquieu, Judicial Degeneracy, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in NATURAL MORAL LAW IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 285, 285–314 (Holger Zaborowski ed., 2010).

\(140\) McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3088 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unlike the other members of the Court, Stevens insists on the importance of the fact that only Chicago’s law was actually at issue. In the courts below, the challenge to this law had been consolidated with another case that also challenged a somewhat more restrictive law in Oak Park, Illinois. The Court, however, had granted certiorari only in the Chicago case.

\(141\) Id. at 3104–05. Stevens also suggests that an appropriately limited decision in petitioners’ favor would help to moderate the legal uncertainty created by Heller’s refusal to specify the contours of the newly recognized right to keep and bear arms. Id. at 3105. This point is in some
After a lengthy discussion of competing considerations, Stevens finally concludes that even this limited recognition of the right to arms would be imprudent. Strikingly, however, he expressly leaves open the possibility that some as-applied challenges to the law might succeed, such as one brought by an elderly widow, living in a dangerous neighborhood, who lacks the physical strength to operate a rifle or shotgun.  

Taken as an exercise in common law adjudication on an issue of first impression, Stevens’s detailed and carefully reasoned analysis is at least perfectly respectable. He acknowledges that this is a difficult case, canvasses competing arguments, and concludes that judicial restraint counsels against intruding on the police power of the states by imposing a single, nationwide rule that courts are ill-equipped to fashion. 

As Stevens recognizes, however, this is not sufficient to justify his conclusion. The common law tradition also requires him to show that his approach is consistent with the Court’s large mass of Fourteenth Amendment precedent, and here he walks on ground that is much more uncertain.

Stevens quickly dismisses Second Amendment incorporation on the ground that Cruikshank had already rejected it. He then argues that the right to a handgun in the home must derive, if at all, from the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause “standing on its own bottom.” 143 Notably, this formulation is not drawn from an opinion of the Court. 144 Nonetheless, Stevens argues at some length that Alito’s invocation of the Duncan/Glucksberg test mischaracterizes the Court’s substantive due process case law. Rather, he argues, the underlying test that dominates those cases is whether “the allegedly unlawful practice violates values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” 145

In light of the shifting nature of the Court’s approach to substantive due process over the last century, which Alito chronicles, it would be hard to say that Stevens’s contention is indefensible. Indeed, if there were one single formulation that explained every decision, it would almost have to be something as vague and devoid of guidance as Stevens’s formulation. As a response to Alito’s position, however, his argument has some obvious problems.

First, the language he quotes is from a case that was later overruled; 146 if both cases were applying the same test, it can hardly be much of a test. Second, an important element of Stevens’s argument—that some protections enumerated in the Bill of Rights apply in a narrower or less protective form when applied to the states under due process—relies

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142. Id. at 3107.
143. Id. at 3103.
144. See id. at 3093 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 500 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in judgment)).
145. Id. at 3096 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)). Palko actually referred to “immunities” (not values) that are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” 302 U.S. at 324.
Third, Stevens’s accurate statement that *Glucksberg* is inconsistent with the Court’s subsequent decision in *Lawrence v. Texas* loses a lot of its force in this context when one considers that *Lawrence* did not even mention *Glucksberg*. Doesn’t Stevens’s understanding of the substantive due process case law turn almost every case into a case of first impression, to be decided under a legal test that can produce any result that a majority of the Court prefers on policy grounds?

Stevens denies this, insisting instead that the law provides adequate guideposts, which allow conscientious judges to avoid the temptation to engage in freewheeling policy analysis. One may doubt that this is so, but one might also wonder how much better the *Duncan/Glucksberg* test is in this respect. At least in this case, moreover, Stevens’s approach exhibits more deference to democratically elected legislatures than Alito’s approach and can be said in that respect to show greater restraint.

This last point, however, is significant only if Stevens can show that such deference is consistent with the law. Neither the Constitution nor the case law articulates a general rule of deference to legislative decisions. Stevens does not claim that the decision in this case was determined by the Court’s precedents, and he recognizes that he has an obligation to defend his conclusions with an argument about the meaning of the Constitution itself.

147. See, e.g., *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3092 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The only actual precedent of the Court on which Stevens can rely involves the Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict, which has been applied to the federal government but not to the states. *Apodaca v. Oregon*, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972). As the plurality opinion points out, that conclusion became a binding holding despite the fact that eight Justices agreed that the Sixth Amendment applies identically to both the federal and state governments. See *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3035 n.14 (plurality opinion).

148. In *McDonald*, Scalia’s concurring opinion offers a characteristically caustic rebuttal of Stevens’s position, arguing that the *Glucksberg* “history and tradition” test constrains judicial discretion far more than Stevens’s interpretation of *Palko’s* reference to “values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’” *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3051–52 (Scalia, J., concurring). Stevens responds by arguing at some length that the two tests are equally malleable, and that his own approach has the virtue of transparency. *Id.* at 3097 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

It seems undeniable that either approach permits what both Justices agree is forbidden, namely, the imposition of judges’ personal notions of sound policy in the guise of the law. I am inclined to think that the *Glucksberg* approach would be considerably more constraining, at least as used in *Glucksberg* itself, if the Court were to become committed to it. But *Lawrence* suggests that this is likely to remain an untested hypothesis.

149. Even granting that Article III contemplates a role for stare decisis in constitutional adjudication, Article VI unambiguously makes the Constitution itself the supreme law of the land and nowhere indicates that judicial opinions have a higher status (or any status as law at all). For a detailed elaboration of this point, see John Harrison, *Judicial Interpretive Finality and the Constitutional Text*, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 33 (2006).

150. See, e.g., *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3107 (“While I agree with the Court that our substantive due process cases offer a principled basis for holding that petitioners have a constitutional right to possess a usable firearm in the home, I am ultimately persuaded that a better reading of our case law supports the city of Chicago.”).
His argument has two main elements. First, he maintains that Thomas’s interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is not clearly correct as a matter of original meaning, and is therefore not an adequate basis on which to overrule *Cruikshank*. On this point, it seems to me, reasonable minds might differ, and Stevens is not clearly wrong. But Stevens agrees that the Due Process Clause does protect a large number of substantive rights, and his second (and crucial) argument is that the decisions recognizing this protection are justified by the *original meaning* of that Clause. Consistent with his claim that the relevant legislative history of the Fourteenth Amendment is hopelessly indeterminate, Stevens rests his argument on the text of the Constitution.

The text of the Constitution provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Stevens reads this to mean that courts are obliged by the text to give substantive content to the word “liberty” by protecting rights that are somehow implied by the Constitution’s use of this term.

Whatever the word “liberty” may mean, however, the text expressly permits the states to deprive people of liberty so long as they are given “due process of law.” Stevens, however, contends that the text forbids the states to deprive people of some kinds of liberty *even when due process of law has been given*. This conclusion is demanded, according to Stevens,

lest superficially fair procedures be permitted to “destroy the enjoyment” of life, liberty, and property, *Poe v. Ullman*, 367 U.S. 497, 541 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting), and the Clause’s prepositional modifier be permitted to swallow its primary command. Procedural guarantees are hollow unless linked to substantive interests; and no amount of process can legitimize some deprivations.

Pause for a moment over this remarkable claim. For fear that due process of law would not do enough to protect liberty, Stevens effectively deletes that part of the Clause from the Constitution, at least for cases in which he thinks due process is not a sufficient constraint on the government.

Alternatively, Stevens contends that “the historical evidence suggests that . . . the phrase ‘due process of law’ had acquired substantive content as a term of art within the legal community.” In support of this suggestion, he quotes snippets from several academic commentators. But the

151. *Id.* at 3088.
152. *Id.* at 3090.
154. *McDonald*, 130 S. Ct. at 3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. *Id.* (emphasis added).
evidence provided by these commentators does not even begin to establish that “due process of law” was generally understood as an invitation for judges to figure out which legal rights are implied by the word “liberty.”

Before the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, some judges had undoubtedly invoked due process of law as an unexplained all-purpose catchphrase to condemn legislation they considered unjust, as Chief Justice Roger B. Taney did in *Dred Scott v. Sandford.* The pointed rebuke in Justice Benjamin R. Curtis’s dissent should be enough to establish that the phrase had not become a term of art meaning that unjust laws are unconstitutional.

It is also true that some state courts had plausibly interpreted “law of the land” and “due process of law” clauses to require legislatures to act through statutes that are sufficiently general to be called laws. But that is completely irrelevant to Stevens’s claim that the Constitution forbids laws that are insufficiently respectful of “liberty.”

And it is true that some judges took these provisions to constitutionalize the settled principles of what one called “the ancient common law of the land.” But that is pretty much the opposite of Stevens’s understanding of an evolving judicial search for “values ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”

Professor James W. Ely Jr., one of the commentators on whom Stevens purports to rely, concluded his survey by stating that antebellum state courts “were increasingly seeing due process as a substantive protection


157. Taney’s entire analysis is contained in the following expostulation:

[An] act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.


158. *Id.* at 624–26 (Curtis, J., dissenting). Responding to a claim that the federal government violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause when it changed the legal tender laws, the Court later said, “Admit it was a hardship, but it is not every hardship that is unjust, much less that is unconstitutional; and certainly it would be an anomaly for us to hold an act of Congress invalid merely because we might think its provisions harsh and unjust.” *Knox v. Lee,* 79 U.S. 457, 552 (1871).

159. These were generally regarded as synonymous terms. Some constitutions use one phrase, and some the other. See John V. Orth, *Due Process of Law: A Brief History* 7–8 (2003).

160. See generally id. (discussing the different ideas to which the phrase “due process of law” may refer).


162. *McDonald,* 130 S. Ct. at 3096 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting *Palko v. Connecticut,* 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
for vested property rights and as a guarantee against class legislation.\textsuperscript{163} Ely made no claim that a consensus existed even as to these very limited points in what he calls “the evolving due process jurisprudence” of the time.\textsuperscript{164} And Ely did not so much as suggest that the phrase had become anything like a term of art.

But let us assume that the limited “substantive” restrictions on legislative discretion described by Ely had frequently been inferred from the terms “law of the land” or “law.” Was such an interpretation of the term “due process of law” generally accepted in the 39th Congress (some of whose members were famously unfamiliar even with \textit{Barron v. Baltimore}\textsuperscript{165}), let alone by the ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment?\textsuperscript{166} Stevens presents no evidence that would support such a claim.

In any event, Stevens is hardly in a position to rest his claim about the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment on what he says the historical record only “suggests”—particularly after dismissing as inconclusive the detailed historical evidence presented by Thomas about the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.\textsuperscript{167} Accordingly, Stevens’ interpretation of the meaning of the text must actually rest on the proposition that the “prepositional modifier”\textsuperscript{168} in the Due Process Clause modifies nothing, and may as well not be in the text.

Consistent with this rewriting of the Constitution’s text, Stevens renames the Due Process Clause. He insists that what he calls “the liberty clause” imposes on the courts a duty to work out the meaning of the liberty protected by that clause through a process of common law adjudication.\textsuperscript{169} In his view, as we have seen, the result has been a search for values “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,”\textsuperscript{170} or more specifically:

\begin{quote}
[T]he ability independently to define one’s identity, the individual’s right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny, and the right to be respected as a human being. Self-determination, bodily integrity, freedom of conscience, intimate relationships, political equality, dignity and
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{163} Ely, \textit{supra} note 156, at 345 (emphasis added). Professors Frederick Mark Gedicks and Earl M. Maltz make similarly limited claims, based largely on the same evidence educed by Ely. See Gedicks, \textit{supra} note 156, at 594; Maltz, \textit{supra} note 156, at 317. Professor Laurence Tribe’s seemingly more expansive claim—“substantive requirements of rationality, non-oppressiveness, and evenhandedness”—is offered with citations to only two cases: one of them does not actually support the general proposition and the other is Chief Justice Taney’s notorious and unreasoned pronouncement in \textit{Dred Scott}. Tribe, \textit{supra} note 156, at 1297 n.247.

\textsuperscript{164} Ely, \textit{supra} note 156, at 343.

\textsuperscript{165} See, e.g., \textit{McDonald}, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3073 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

\textsuperscript{166} See, e.g., \textit{id.} at 3078–80.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{McDonald}, 130 S. Ct. at 3090 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

\textsuperscript{168} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{169} \textit{Id.} at 3091.

\textsuperscript{170} \textit{Id.} at 3098.
respect—these are the central values we have found implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.  

Whether or not this is an accurate summary of the relevant case law, it is hard to deny that the application of these “central values” to specific cases cannot be guided by anything that is actually in the Constitution. I do not understand Stevens to disagree. Thus, with the Constitution rendered irrelevant, judicial restraint becomes indistinguishable from the proper conduct of pure common law adjudication. Because no legislature has the power to correct constitutional decisions that reflect a willful exercise of the judicial power, Stevens’s version of judicial restraint presupposes that the discipline of common law reasoning is an adequate substitute for the written law.

V. INACTIVE (JUDICIAL) LIBERTY: JUSTICE BREYER’S DISSERT

No other member of the Court joined Justice Stevens’s opinion. Writing for the other three dissenters, Justice Breyer was unwilling to ignore the settled selective incorporation jurisprudence on which the plurality had relied. In applying that body of case law, Breyer invokes two main principles of judicial restraint: a presumption against extending the reach of highly questionable precedents and a presumption against judicial abridgements of the police power of the states.

To justify reliance on the first presumption, Breyer renews and supplements the attack on Heller that had informed the dissenting opinions in that case. He focuses his critique (1) on the Heller majority’s admission that the Second Amendment was adopted for the purpose of protecting the militia, and (2) on shortcomings that he sees in Heller’s historical claim that the Second Amendment codified a preexisting private right to arms for personal self-defense. While only suggesting that Heller should be reconsidered, Breyer contends that where a decision rests entirely on historical foundations that are highly uncertain, its applicability should at least not be extended.

171. Id. at 3101 (internal citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See, for example, this passage from Stevens’s opinion:

[S]ensitivity to the interaction between the intrinsic aspects of liberty and the practical realities of contemporary society provides an important tool for guiding judicial discretion.

This sensitivity is an aspect of a deeper principle: the need to approach our work with humility and caution. Because the relevant constitutional language is so spacious, I have emphasized that the doctrine of judicial self-restraint requires us to exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.

Id. at 3101–02 (internal citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted).

173. Id. at 3120 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Breyer mistakenly attributes this approach to “[t]he Court,” id., overlooking the fact that Thomas rejected the applicability of that body of case law.
174. Id. at 3121.
175. Id. at 3122.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol63/iss3/1
Turning to selective incorporation itself, Breyer asks whether “the right in question has remained fundamental over time.”\(^176\) Breyer is reluctant to rely heavily on history, from which he thinks it is often impossible to get useful or reliable answers. Instead, he lists several other factors:

\[
\text{[T]he nature of the right; any contemporary disagreement about whether the right is fundamental; the extent to which incorporation will further other, perhaps more basic, constitutional aims; and the extent to which incorporation will advance or hinder the Constitution’s structural aims, including its division of powers among different governmental institutions (and the people as well). Is incorporation needed, for example, to further the Constitution’s effort to ensure that the government treats each individual with equal respect? Will it help maintain the democratic form of government that the Constitution foresees? In a word, will incorporation prove consistent, or inconsistent, with the Constitution’s efforts to create governmental institutions well suited to the carrying out of its constitutional promises?}\(^177\)
\]

It is a little difficult to see how this could provide more certainty or predictability than the historical inquiry pursued, in different ways, in the Alito and Thomas opinions. Breyer’s is a spirit-of-the-Constitution approach, untethered to the specific provisions of the document and easily capable of justifying virtually any result in virtually any case.

Consider just one example. Breyer belittles the importance of the views of the enacting generation because he thinks a right should not be incorporated unless it “has remained fundamental over time.”\(^178\) He then argues that there is no contemporary consensus that the right to arms is fundamental, relying largely on his contention that “every State regulates firearms extensively, and public opinion is sharply divided on the appropriate level of regulation.”\(^179\)

At the time they were incorporated, however, one could have said the same thing about many other rights that are now protected against state action. Speech, for example, has always been extensively regulated, and there have always been disagreements about how it should be regulated. Would anyone infer from those facts that there has never been a consensus that the right of free speech is fundamental? It is a transparent logical fallacy to say that disagreements about the appropriate way to regulate a right imply disagreements about whether the right is fundamental.

As Alito points out, moreover, the Court did have evidence of a contemporary consensus on the question at issue in this case. An amicus brief filed by fifty-eight senators and 251 members of the House of

\[^{176}\text{Id. at 3123.}\]
\[^{177}\text{Id.}\]
\[^{178}\text{Id.}\]
\[^{179}\text{Id. at 3124.}\]
Representatives and another brief filed by thirty-eight state governments urged the Court to incorporate the Second Amendment right. Breyer responds that other amici took a different position. If such large supermajorities of the people’s elected representatives do not show the existence of a consensus, simply because other amici took an opposing position, consensus must mean “virtual unanimity.” By that standard, there may be virtually no fundamental rights in America today.

Notwithstanding the potpourri of factors that Breyer draws from his vision of the spirit of the Constitution, his driving principle in this case appears to be a conviction that incorporation of the Second Amendment right will require judges to engage in essentially legislative activities. Just as he believes the Heller Court was incompetent to resolve disputes among professional historians about the meaning of the Second Amendment, so too will incorporation of the right require “finding answers to complex empirically based questions of a kind that legislatures are better able than courts to make.”

Breyer is certainly correct that adjudication of cases in this area will necessarily require courts to balance the government’s interest in public safety against the individual’s interest in self-protection. And he acknowledges that a similar kind of balancing between public and private interests is required in the enforcement of other individual rights. Both the Heller Court and Alito’s plurality opinion in this case insisted that the challenge is no greater here than elsewhere, a claim that Breyer dismisses as “mere assertion.” But Breyer’s dismissal is itself mere assertion, and it is hard to foresee a developed body of Second Amendment case law that will involve more difficult and fine-grained judgments than those found in the existing jurisprudences of free speech, cruel and unusual punishment, and unreasonable search and seizure.

Whatever the accuracy of Breyer’s implausible predictions about the future, what is the source of his extremely strong presumption against recognizing this particular right? “[T]he important factors that favor incorporation in other instances—e.g., the protection of broader constitutional objectives—are not present here.” Implicit in this judgment is a view of “constitutional objectives” that effectively makes the Constitution irrelevant. Its irrelevance is reflected in the fact that Breyer does not feel obliged to make reasoned arguments from the Constitution when deciding that some rights (enumerated or not) deserve judicial

180. Id. at 3049 (plurality opinion). Alito, however, did not agree that incorporation doctrine contains a “popular consensus today” requirement.
181. Id. at 3124 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 3126. This appears to be the unifying principle in the list of factors that Breyer thinks weigh against incorporation: “[T]he superiority of legislative decisionmaking, the need for local decisionmaking, the comparative desirability of democratic decisionmaking, the lack of a manageable judicial standard, and the life-threatening harm that may flow from striking down regulations all argue against incorporation.” Id. at 3129.
183. For further discussion, see Lund, supra note 71, at 1368–75.
184. Id. at 3126 (citing examples of cases arising under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments).
185. Id. at 3127.
186. Id. at 3129.
protection, while others do not.

Because he does not engage in the kind of detailed common law reasoning that we find in Stevens’s opinion, Breyer may be said to go even further in the direction that Stevens marked out. If Stevens aspires to the restraint of a model common law judge, Breyer’s restraint resembles that of an 18th Century common law jury. Those juries, of course, delivered only judgments, not opinions. This form of restraint, however, is not one that Breyer would impose on himself or the Court.

VI. CONCLUSION

If these four opinions all exemplify judicial restraint, then the term is every bit as meaningless as its opposite, judicial activism, is often said to be. In my view, the Stevens and Breyer versions depart from the proper judicial role because both of them effectively replace the rule of the written law with the rule of whoever happens to sit on the bench at any given moment. I recognize, of course, that those who prefer the rule of judges (or the rule of judges like Stevens and Breyer) are unlikely to be dissuaded from that view by anything I could say.

I find the dispute between Alito and Thomas far more interesting and difficult to resolve. I acknowledge that any interpretive method can be manipulated, and I recognize that all judges will sometimes have difficulty in overcoming the human tendency to find the answer that appeals to their own policy preferences. That said, I have little doubt that the Thomas and Alito approaches are more likely than the other two to approximate the rule of law.

As the analysis in this Article may suggest, I find myself inclined toward Thomas’s position, notwithstanding my doubts about the soundness of the historical claims on which his conclusions largely rest. Whether or not his answer is right, he addressed the questions posed by this particular case and by the Constitution. A form of judicial restraint that refuses to subordinate those questions to other considerations may appear idiosyncratic in today’s dominant legal culture. That does not make it wrong.