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Reforming the U.N. Security Council: Open Letter to Kofi Annan

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Hammer, Reforming the U.N. Security Council, Annan
OPEN LETTER TO U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL KOFI ANNAN*

“The Council’s ineffectiveness [is] attributable to the fact that the present structure [does not] reflect the current composition of the international community, nor the present distribution of power between nations There must be limits on the right to veto.”
— Bernd Niehaus¹

Dear Mr. Secretary-General:

We begin by commending your leadership and strength as Secretary-General of the United Nations. Under your guidance, the United Nations remains an indispensable organization, the work of which will one day allow the world to realize a lasting peace. Your own work is a testament to the fundamental U.N. principles of ensuring sovereign equality for all members of the U.N. General Assembly, and guaranteeing the maintenance of international peace and security. Your commitment to these principles reflect the U.N. slogan, “[a]ll human rights for all,”² and your continuing dedication to equality, democracy, and national integrity will be your legacy to the global community.

I. THE PROBLEM: THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

It is in the spirit of equality, democracy, and national integrity that we write you to begin a more effective public discussion regarding the expansion and reform of the U.N. Security Council. Although the subject of U.N. Security Council reform is not one typically addressed by the Secretary-General,³ your position does not prohibit you from

* This letter is from Craig Hammer, a student in the University of Florida Levin College of Law International Organizations Course. Craig Hammer also wishes to acknowledge Marco Kirby, Na Oyoo Quartey, and Shireen Hormozdi for their research assistance.

1. Ambassador Bernd Niehaus, Representative from Costa Rica, *Assembly Continues Consideration of Security Council Reform: Discusses Permanent and Non-Permanent Council Membership and Use of Veto*, (Nov. 17, 2000), 56th Sess., 66th mtg., U.N. Doc. GA/9826, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20001117.ga9826.doc.html> (last visited Dec. 26, 2002).

2. This slogan was the theme for the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1998. See *The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, A Magna Carta for All Humanity*, available at <http://www.unhcr.ch/udhr/miscinfo/carta.htm> (last visited Dec. 21, 2002).

3. Press Release, United Nations, Secretary-General Speaks of Security Council Reform in Lecture at Foreign Ministry of Mexico (Mar. 4, 1996) U.N. Doc. SG/SM/5906, available at <http://>

emphasizing the importance of such reform and urging the U.N. General Assembly to adopt an effectual reformation scheme.⁴ In 1996, your predecessor, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali admitted that U.N. Security Council reform was “a subject that a Secretary-General was not supposed to address.” However his conviction that “Security Council reform [was and] is a critical issue . . . [that] must be dealt with” compelled him to address it, despite it being taboo for him to do so.⁵ He punctuated the importance of such reform when he further asserted that “[Security Council reform] can be at the heart of a United Nations transformed into a truly effective system for the maintenance of international peace and security, now and in the future.”⁶

Boutros-Ghali’s statement was more than a passionate sentiment. Rather, it pinpointed an internationally recognized problem and effectively authorized the position of the Secretary-General to be one which must guide the examination process surrounding the ultimate adoption of a reformation package. Inherent in the position of Secretary-General is the duty to act so that such reform will come to fruition.⁷

You will recall that in 1993, the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of the Equitable Representation on and Increase in the

www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19960304.sgsm5906.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Boutros-Ghali Press Release].

4. *Id.*

5. *Id.*

6. *Id.*

7. Article 23 of the U.N. Charter identifies the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council (P-Five), which are the United States, China, France, United Kingdom, and Russia. U.N. Charter art. 23. Article 23 empowers the U.N. General Assembly to elect non-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. *Id.* The rules for voting to which the U.N. Security Council must adhere are articulated in Article 27 of the U.N. Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 27. Both Articles 23 and 27 were amended by acts of the U.N. General Assembly on December 17, 1963, and came into force on August 31, 1965. Boutros-Ghali Press Release, *supra* note 3. The amendment to Article 23 enlarged the U.N. Security Council’s membership from eleven to fifteen states and the amendment to Article 27 raised the number of affirmative votes needed for a decision to pass from seven to nine votes, not including the concurring votes of the P-Five. *Id.* Accordingly, Boutros-Ghali asserted that by amending these Articles, the U.N. General Assembly set a precedent under which it can amend the U.N. Charter “to fit changing circumstances and new needs.” *Id.* This means that the Secretary-General can respond to the existing international outcry for U.N. Security Council reformation and encourage the affected or more outspoken member states to propose a viable U.N. Charter amendment. To pass muster, a proposed U.N. General Assembly resolution with U.N. Charter amendment implications requires a two-thirds majority vote of the U.N. General Assembly according to Article 108 of the U.N. Charter. Sir, as Secretary-General, you may guide this process by advocating reform. See U.N. CHARTER art. 108.

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Membership of the Security Council (Working Group)⁸ was established to consider all aspects concerning the restructuring of the U.N. Security Council's membership. Additionally, three years after you began your tenure as Secretary-General came the adoption of the U.N. Millennium Declaration,⁹ in which heads of state and government resolved to intensify their efforts to achieve "a comprehensive Security Council reform in all its aspects."¹⁰ Even though the Working Group previously recommended that the U.N. General Assembly's consideration of U.N. Security Council reform be continued at the U.N. General Assembly's (current) fifty-seventh session, we, as concerned students, have noticed that little progress has been made in the current agenda.

The problem to which Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali referred in his statement has been repeatedly articulated by a host of U.N. General Assembly members:¹¹ the composition of the U.N. Security Council still does not conform to the fundamental principles and methods needed to maintain international peace and security as required by the U.N. Charter.¹² Specifically, Boutros-Ghali declared that "there is widespread agreement among Member States that the Council's present membership and composition do not reflect the realities of economic and political change, and are unrepresentative of the membership at large."¹³ His belief echoed the concerns held by various member states, which harmonize on the issue of U.N. Security Council reform. They believe the U.N. Security Council to be a fragmented, unrepresentative

8. See Report of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Question of Equitable Representation on an Increase in the Membership of the Security Council, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 47, para. 8, U.N. Doc. A/48/47 (1994).

9. See *supra* note 2.

10. *Id.*

11. Among the more outspoken, concerned countries are Germany, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Brazil, Ukraine, Austria, Malaysia, Poland, Mexico, Andorra, Argentina, Cuba, Colombia, Egypt, and Senegal. See Press Release, United Nations, General Assembly Hears of Frustration at Lack of Progress in Three-Year Effort Towards Reform of Security Council (Oct. 20, 1996), U.N. Doc. GA/9145, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19961029.ga9145.html> (last visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Frustration Press Release].

12. Currently, the U.N. Security Council is made up of 15 members; 5 permanent members with an individual veto power and 10 non-permanent members who are elected by the U.N. General Assembly for 2-year terms with no individual veto power. Michel J. Kelly, *U.N. Security Council Permanent Membership: A New Proposal for a Twenty-First Century Council*, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 319, 328 (2000).

13. Boutros-Ghali Press Release, *supra* note 3.

body that will increasingly damage international relations absent a workable reformation initiative.¹⁴

By the terms of the draft decision of the U.N. Millenium Declaration, the U.N. General Assembly would welcome amendments to the structure of the U.N. Security Council. Widespread provisional agreements to bring about U.N. Security Council reform have been recorded on several occasions and various proposals have been made to the Working Group regarding substantive reform.¹⁵ However, in nearly ten years, the Working Group has been unable to reach a consensus on a substantial reform package and the need for a meaningful reform of the U.N. Security Council persists. We believe that U.N. Security Council reform should remain a priority in the U.N. Assembly's agenda.

Despite the support manifested by the U.N. General Assembly to reform the U.N. Security Council throughout the forty-eighth through the fifty-sixth sessions, we have reviewed the agenda of the fifty-seventh session and found that U.N. Security Council reform has seemingly been pushed to the wayside. We can only assume that the reasons for the U.N. General Assembly's redirected attention are that the U.N. Assembly's role in seeking a peaceful solution to the enmity between the West and the Middle-East, and its ongoing effort to combat global terrorism have taken precedence. The U.N. Security Council's reaction to the terrorist attacks suffered by the United States in 2001 was immediate and resolute, and we were gratified to observe a united U.N. Security Council combat a horrific threat to international peace and security. However, in the wake of these terrorist attacks, it was clear that such threats to international peace and security had to be addressed by an accurate representation of the global community. The international dialogue regarding the attacks were controlled by the ever-vocal elite. We feel that this injured the legitimacy of the U.N. Security Council, because the U.N. General Assembly has conferred the vital responsibility of maintaining international peace and security for all —

14. Cf. Amber Fitzgerald, *Security Council Reform: Creating a More Representative Body of the Entire U.N. Membership*, 12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 319, 321 (2002).

15. See Frustration Press Release, *supra* note 11 (for examples of the various proposals); see, e.g., Press Release, General Assembly Opens Debate on Security Council Reform, Including Increase in Membership and Equitable Representation, (Nov. 19, 1998) U.N. Doc. GA/9508, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19981119.ga9508.html> (last visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Debate Press Release].

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not just some — of its members on the U.N. Security Council.¹⁶ In order for the U.N. Security Council to achieve such unquestionable legitimacy, it must reflect the political landscape that currently exists in the global community.

The composition of the U.N. Security Council is perhaps the most highly criticized aspect of the United Nations because while all 191 member states are essentially the “owners” of the United Nations, the idiosyncratic attitudes had by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (P-Five) toward the world body often leave a great deal to be desired in terms of their representative capacity.¹⁷ Frequently, the P-Five have put their short-term national self-interests before their international obligations under the U.N. Charter.¹⁸ Additionally, their veto power, which effectively makes the P-Five the authoritative voice of the U.N. General Assembly, gives them unfettered discretion to continually perpetrate this counterproductive form of prioritizing.¹⁹ Under the U.N.s’ current membership scheme, we believe that the probability that the P-Five’s official actions will spontaneously begin to consistently protect universal — not individual — interests is low. We also feel that to combat this imbalance of international power, the global community must be better educated and activated to seek real solutions to this problem if the United Nations is to grow in strength and capacity in the coming decades.

Hence, we believe, as do many other members of the global community, that the mechanisms of the U.N. Security Council are in need of overhaul. The structure and purpose of the U.N. Security Council has been deliberated over for several years and little real

16. Article 24 of the U.N. Charter states that, “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.” U.N. CHARTER art. 24.

17. See generally Fitzgerald, *supra* note 14.

18. Richard Butler, *United Nations: Security Council Isn’t Performing*, INT. HERALD TRIBUNE, Aug. 5, 1999.

19. To illustrate this point, if a crisis which threatens international peace and security arises, and one or more members of the P-Five vetoes a sound U.N. General Assembly proposal that combats and rectifies that crisis, then the remainder of the U.N. Security Council and practically the whole of the U.N. General Assembly are rendered powerless. This abuse of veto power has generated marked international frustration, and prevented the United Nations from resolving many disputes in which millions of people suffered and died because of the absence of international intervention that should have been spearheaded by the U.N. Security Council. Consequently, the numbers of domestic and international conflicts have increased because proposals regarding humanitarian intervention and military enforcement measures are often vetoed by some member or members of the P-Five for self-interested reasons.

progress has been made to achieve a truly representative, democratic U.N. Security Council.²⁰ As a vital body for the promotion of international peace and security, the U.N. Security Council's *raison d'être* of conflict avoidance and resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, and its steadfast protection of all human rights are in danger of being increasingly sidelined because the U.N. Security Council's current membership structure is less genuinely representative of the Twenty-First Century's political, social, and economic realities than it should be.

II. THE SOLUTION: FORMULATING A SCHEME TO REFORM THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL

Several models to reform the U.N. Security Council exist, which restructure the composition of the P-Five, their veto rights, and the makeup of the non-permanent member structure.²¹ Many of these models further allow the U.N. Security Council's mandate to develop U.N. Security Council policies toward such issues as humanitarian intervention and the right of intervention within a member state if internal conflict causes — or threatens to cause — a threat to international peace and security. We ask that the consideration of these models by the Working Group be made a high priority on the U.N. General Assembly's agenda, either during the current session or during the fifty-ninth session. The U.N. Security Council must resume its proper place at the very core of international security policy-making and implementation. To do so effectively, U.N. Security Council reformation is requisite.

Sir, to better facilitate your ability to act on our request that you guide the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a viable U.N. Security Council reformation scheme, we have scrutinized reformation schemes proposed by a series of the most outspoken member states of the U.N.

20. The United Nations has expanded its membership from just 50 states at San Francisco in 1945 to 191 today. Carolyn L. Willson, *Current Development: Changing the Charter: The United Nations Prepares for the Twenty-First Century*, 90 A.J.I.L. 115 (1996). It is striking that the membership of the U.N. Security Council has not recently been evaluated because it remains unrepresentative of U.N. membership.

21. See, e.g., Kelly, *supra* note 12 (for U.N. Security Council reform proposals); see also Global Policy Security Council Documents, available at <http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/docs/index.htm> (last visited Dec. 10, 2002).

General Assembly,²² including those from Norway,²³ Germany,²⁴ Italy,²⁵ Kenya,²⁶ Austria,²⁷ Brazil,²⁸ Malaysia,²⁹ Poland,³⁰ Mexico,³¹ Andorra,³²

22. Press Release, Norway Proposes Five New Permanent Seats on Security Council as General Assembly Continues Debate on Reform Issues (Oct. 30, 1996) U.N. Doc. GA/9146, available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19961030.ga9146.html> (last visited Dec. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Norway Press Release].

23. Speaking for all Nordic countries in 1996, the representative of Norway proposed that five new permanent seats should be created and composed of a state from Africa, one from Asia, and one from Latin America and the Caribbean must be among the new permanent members in order to reflect political and economic realities. *Id.*

24. In 1996, Tono Eitel, the German representative, offered no concrete numerical figures to specify the nature of member state representation among the U.N. Security Council. Rather, he proposed that serious political negotiations be engaged in determining the number of member states that would comprise the U.N. Security Council. Germany has garnered much international support from other member states, especially Italy, which proposed that the U.N. General Assembly create a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council for Germany and Japan. *Id.*

25. In 1996, Francesco Paolo Fulci's Italian proposal emerged as a main option for guiding the reform of the U.N. Security Council, and we attempt to emulate it to a degree. In this proposal, Fulci suggested that the U.N. General Assembly adopt ten new non-permanent seats which would rotate among 30 member states that would be elected by the U.N. General Assembly for two-year terms. The selection of the pool of 30 non-permanent member states would be based on unspecified objective criteria that would be determined by the U.N. General Assembly. *Id.*

26. In 1996, the representative from Kenya proposed that Africa be granted two permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. Additionally, he proposed that not less than twenty-five non-permanent seats would be required to ensure "equitable geographic representation on the Council." *Id.*

27. In 1996, Ernst Sucharipa, the representative from Austria, proposed that only a small enlargement of the U.N. Security Council was necessary to safeguard democratic elements and ensure equitable representation. The official Austrian proposal suggested that the U.N. Security Council should have no more than 25 members. Norway Press Release, *supra* note 22.

28. In 1996, Celso Amorim, the representative from Brazil, proposed that the U.N. Security Council be enlarged to allow for greater participation by those countries that are capable and willing to bear the responsibilities. *Id.*

29. In 1996, Bin Agam Hasmy, the representative from Malaysia, proposed that both permanent and non-permanent U.N. Security Council membership be increased because of the "increasingly important role of regionalism in inter-state relations." Specifically, Hasmy proposed that eight additional permanent seats be added as well as an increase in non-permanent members for a total of twenty-seven members on the U.N. Security Council. *Id.*

30. In 1996, Zbigniew Wlosowicz, the representative from Poland, was less disposed to a significant increase in the number of member states on the U.N. Security Council. Poland's official position was that the ideal size of the U.N. Security Council lay "probably between twenty-one and twenty-five" members. *Id.*

31. In 1996, Manuel Tello, the representative from Mexico, proposed that there be no increase in the number of permanent members on the U.N. Security Council. *Id.*

32. In 1996, Juli Minoves-Triquell, the representative from Andorra, expressed concern as to the size of the U.N. Security Council as proposed by a series of other member states. He felt that

Cuba,³³ Senegal,³⁴ Egypt,³⁵ Ukraine,³⁶ Turkey,³⁷ Australia,³⁸ Algeria,³⁹ and the Russian Federation.⁴⁰ We have chosen the reformation proposals set out by these states because we believe that they reflect the most comprehensive, practical solutions and suggestions yet proposed to the U.N. General Assembly.

Our scrutiny of these proposals has led us to conclude that there exists two main issues that a viable solution must address: the question of how the composition of the U.N. Security Council can be made to more effectively represent the U.N. General Assembly, and the question of how veto power may be employed. Hence, we have created two possible solutions: one is a short-term pragmatic solution that is suitable

the larger the U.N. Security Council, the more difficulty the U.N. Security Council would have in its decision-rendering. Norway Press Release, *supra* note 22.

33. In 1996, Bruno Rodriguez, the representative from Cuba, proposed that broadening membership in the U.N. Security Council, but opposed the existence of permanent seats in general. *Id.*

34. Debate Press Release, *supra* note 15. In 1998, Ibra Deguene Ka, the representative from Senegal, proposed on behalf of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), now the African Union, that Africa be given two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council that would be occupied on a rotating basis in order "to correct the existing imbalance." *Id.*

35. In 1998, Nabil Elaraby, the Egyptian representative, introduced the draft resolution on the question of equitable representation on an increase in the membership of the U.N. Security Council. He proposed that any country that wished to enter as a permanent or non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council or wished to reform the U.N. Security Council in any way "should do so according to the Charter." *Id.*

36. In 1998, Volodymer Yel'Chenko, the representative from Ukraine, sought support for Ukraine's election bid to become a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council in order to secure a seat for the Eastern European Group. *Id.*

37. In 1998, Tuluy Tanc, the representative from Turkey, suggested that any mere enlargement of the U.N. Security Council would not solve the problematic situation regarding the accurate representation of the U.N. General Assembly among the members of the U.N. Security Council. Instead, he proposed that a "fair and workable system of rotation" be adopted. *Id.*

38. In 1998, Penny Wensley, the representative from Australia, supported expansion of the U.N. Security Council by proposing that under-represented developing regions, Germany, and Japan be made permanent members of the U.N. Security Council. Additionally, she proposed that the number of non-permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council be increased to a figure that she did not specify. *Id.*

39. In 1998, Abdallah Baali, the representative from Algeria, supported what remains the African common position, and proposed that Africa be granted two permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council, which would be rotated among all African states. Debate Press Release, *supra* note 15.

40. In 1998, Sergey Lavrov, the representative from the Russian Federation, proposed that the number of members in an enlarged U.N. Security Council "not exceed twenty or twenty-one." This enlargement of the U.N. Security Council, he suggested, should include industrial as well as developing nations, which should be treated equally in terms of status. *Id.*

for immediate adoption, and the other is a long-term goal that we hope the U.N. Security Council will someday achieve.

III. THE SOLUTION: SHORT-TERM FOR IMMEDIATE ADOPTION

By extrapolating from the proposals of the above named countries, we have synthesized our own proposal that is mindful of the caveats contemplated by representatives from Austria, Brazil, Malaysia, Poland, Mexico, Andorra, and Cuba and emulates the suggested composition of the U.N. Security Council, as proposed by representatives from Norway, Germany, Italy, Kenya, Senegal, Egypt, Ukraine, Turkey, Australia, Algeria, and the Russian Federation. We propose that the U.N. Security Council consist of twenty members which would be distributed as follows: The P-Five and their veto powers would remain unchanged (United States, United Kingdom, China, Russia, France). Semi-permanent membership with veto powers would be granted to five rotating seats with two-year terms from among a series of so-called "middle powers."⁴¹ These "middle powers" could include Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Ukraine. We selected these countries according to the standard articulated by Representative Celso Amorim of Brazil.⁴² We feel that each member of this pool of "middle states" is "capable and willing to bear the [responsibilities]" of semi-permanent membership and veto power because of each state's political, social, and economic strength.⁴³ The non-permanent membership without veto power would remain unchanged, with ten rotating seats for two-year terms from the remainder of the U.N. General Assembly members.⁴⁴

According to this structure, the ethnic and cultural makeup of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council would be representative of the world community, and smaller countries would finally have the opportunity to participate in decision-making on a global level. Additionally, by allowing states from the Middle-East and the former Soviet republics (which are predominantly Muslim) to

41. *See id.*

42. *See supra* text accompanying note 28.

43. We acknowledge that the political, social, and economic strengths among these "middle powers" do vary, but they are consistent because they are neither dominant world powers nor are they third world powers.

44. *See* Timothy Penny & Mark Mullenbach, *UN's Chosen Few — a Tricky Feat*, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 24, 1997, at 19 (for a similar U.N. Security Council reform proposal).

become semi-permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, the U.N. Security Council would at last give a voice to cultures which have historically been denied the opportunity to articulate their views in a global arena.

Furthermore, we believe that this structure would foster a greater sense of international cooperation among the members of the U.N. Security Council. By employing our proposal, the balance of Security Council veto power would be shifted away from a few member-states. Power would instead be shared among a representative sample of many states. Additionally, the P-Five's unfettered discretion would disappear and as a result, diplomatic solutions would replace U.N. Security Council actions that reflect idiosyncratic national interests.

IV. THE SOLUTION: THE LONG-TERM GOAL

While we stand by our proposal for a short-term solution to the U.N. Security Council's ineffectual representative membership structure, we would someday like to see the U.N. Security Council do away with veto power and permanent member states altogether. Our hope for the future of the U.N. Security Council mirrors proposals made to the U.N. General Assembly by Juli Minoves Triquell, the representative of Andora, who described the veto as "a relic of the Second World War" that should be disposed of,⁴⁵ and by Juan Ruiz, the representative of Colombia, who has consistently asserted that the veto is an outdated decision-making mechanism.⁴⁶ We believe that by abolishing the U.N. Security Council veto, the U.N. General Assembly can truly adhere to the Preamble of the U.N. Charter, in which the U.N. General Assembly "[reaffirms its] faith in . . . the equal rights of . . . nations large and small."⁴⁷

Additionally, we concur with Bruno Rodriguez, the representative from Cuba, who declared that permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council are "discriminatory and selective, and would never, as long as they existed, ensure the representation deserved and desired by the developing world."⁴⁸ Again, we believe that the U.N. General Assembly will continue to be consistently unable to abide by the Preamble of the U.N. Charter until each member-state has an equal opportunity to assist

45. See *supra* text accompanying note 32.

46. See Frustration Press Release, *supra* note 11.

47. U.N. CHARTER pmb1.

48. See *supra* text accompanying note 33.

all other member-states to make global decisions, perhaps by a plurality of all votes taken among the U.N. General Assembly.

Mr. Secretary-General, if both the short-term and long-term structures that we have submitted as templates for the reformation of the U.N. Security Council are infeasible, at this time then we ask that the Working Group continue its diligent U.N. General Assembly-supported search for a satisfactory U.N. Security Council reformation scheme. We have faith that the Working Group will one day create a U.N. Security Council membership structure that will achieve the genuine international cooperation which the world of the Twenty-First Century requires in order to confront contemporary and potential violent conflicts. We write to you because these violent conflicts have caused, and will continue to cause, the suffering of countless civilians, from refugees and internally displaced people to the millions around the world that are afflicted by widespread poverty, hunger, illness, and lack of education.

We believe that reforming the U.N. Security Council is the essential *sine qua non* of the global community's achievement of the many goals set by the United Nations at summit conferences, in U.N. declarations, in practice, and in conventions. Without such reform, we fear that genuine global peace and justice will long be consigned to the sphere of rhetoric instead of action. Zamira Eshmambetova, the representative from Kyrgyzstan, fittingly identified our collective position regarding U.N. Security Council reform by stating that the Working Group's lack of progress was the direct result of the fact that there have been "too many discussions and not enough negotiations," and that "the time has come for genuine negotiations, compromise, and action."⁴⁹ Sir, we believe that as Secretary-General of the United Nations, and as a citizen of the world, you are equal to the task at hand. We ask you to actively guide the U.N. General Assembly to adopt a workable solution to reform the U.N. Security Council.

Sincerely,

Craig Hammer

49. See Debate Press Release, *supra* note 15.

