United States (p. 98).

The modern self-styled liberal can see his philosophy of government at its zenith in the typical Rent Control Office memoranda in the complex yet spicy *File on Sigrid Olson* (p. 259); the budding practitioner will get a cold chill from *The Eclipse of a Legal Light (A Tragedy in Business Cards)* (p. 50); and counsel for any comely female plaintiff will find the key to success against a corporate defendant in the succinct and forthright basis of liability propounded in *Daisy Whiffle v. Twitter Bird Seed Company* (p. 20). The will of Herman Oberweis, written by Herman himself in dialect and actually offered for probate in 1934, is a true classic (p. 248); and all lay cynics should note that Herman's grim determination to see that one of his brothers, "the schlaimial Oscar dont nothing get," leads him into the bog of future interests without any prompting from those evil legal technicians that all of us in the profession are reputed to be.

But enough of analysis; good humor deserves a better fate than exposition. The book is delightful. Only a few passages seem labored, probably because most of the selections have so much more sparkle than one expects from a "dismal trade" (p. viii). The Judicial Humorist as a type may well remain on Koko's list but, despite the omission of the mordant wit of *Trial by Jury* and of the brilliantly satirical lines of the Lord Chancellor in *Iolanthe*, Sir William Gilbert himself, who understood the law only too well, would have enjoyed this collection. And so should any jurist, even if he wears a mortarboard or a robe.

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This is a work prepared especially for publication in the United States, the original English edition having appeared in 1948. Its author, an English lawyer of note, analyzes the development of warfare from the Stone Age through the Korean conflict against a background of solid knowledge of jurisprudence.

This analysis discloses a gradual twentieth-century reversion to
barbarism in methods of warfare and concepts of war crimes trials, resulting in the military excesses of World War II and the Korean War. To Veale, this reversion poses vast problems for the future; the logic of his development leads to a hideous choice of possibilities, one of which he considers certain of realization. Some later generation, he reasons, will live in an Orwellian atmosphere of constant, but purposely undecisive, hot-cold war among vast areas of influence; or it will be reduced to the economic, social, and moral state of primitive man by an all-consuming conflict involving the mass use of atomic devices, electronic missiles, and the like.

Advance to Barbarism expresses throughout an almost sentimental longing for the type of warfare that Veale chooses to call "civilized." This warfare, which reached its zenith around 1758 with the publication of Emeric de Vattel's The Law of Nations, had as its code the principles that hostilities between civilized peoples must be limited to the armed forces actually engaged and that defeated military leaders should not be tried for ex post facto war crimes. These concepts, Veale states, were gradually diminished in strength by the passing of the Age of Reason and the development of total war mentalities. Speaking of the eighteenth century Veale writes: "A limitless capacity to believe without a reason and to hate without a cause was not then, as at present, prized as an essential quality of the good citizen" (p. 65). In 1940 barbarism, says Veale, became the accepted European practice with the first mass air raids. Next came the stark, primary warfare of the Second World War, followed by the war crimes trials at Nuremburg and Tokyo and the more barbarous minor ones in eastern and southern Europe.

The war crimes trials are vigorously condemned: Veale seems to imply that Roosevelt and Churchill at Teheran were overly impressed by Stalin's insistence that the German leaders be shot by a firing squad and consequently consented to the formation of the International Military Tribunal. As the trials progressed, however, it must be admitted that the western peoples became generally quite enthusiastic. Unquestionably the trials were more in the spirit of the Soviet "mock trial" than the Anglo-American judicial process; ex post facto crimes, criminal action without essential jurisdiction, and accusers acting as prosecutors and judges are not the proudest concepts of our law. Speaking of the 1945 London Agreement for these trials, Veale writes: "Had the contracting parties been, say Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, and Salvador, such an agreement would only have been of little
interest as an indication of how little the elements of jurisprudence were understood in those countries” (p. 155).

The author's objective is to attempt to show that the nations are putting each other into a position that will require either constant warfare or mass destruction of the enemy, to avoid the extermination of their military leaders after a war. This point has been made by numerous other writers, and it unquestionably has merit. Veale's solution, however, is weak: he proposes simply a return to "national sanity, diplomatic neutrality, and truly pacific internationalism" (p. 284). But only in days of "civilized warfare" among nations of relatively equal culture did these words have some meaning. Unhappily Veale makes no satisfactory proposal for the solution of today's fight between vastly different and essentially conflicting ideologies, although he quite adequately tells us where we are going.

Early in the work an able discussion of the nature of warfare is presented which enables Veale's readers to follow his somewhat tortured later narrative. His enthusiasm for documentation obscures many of his ideas, and at mid-point the work is fairly well bogged down in a morass of tiny facts. More synthesis would have been desirable.

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