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Law of the Intermediated Information Exchange

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LAW OF THE INTERMEDIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE

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Abstract

When Wikipedia, Google, and other online service providers staged a “blackout protest” against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) in January 2012, their actions inadvertently emphasized a fundamental truth that is often missed about the nature of cyberlaw. In attempts to address what is unique about the field, commentators have failed to appreciate that the field could—and should—be reconceptualized as a law of the global intermediated information exchange. Such a conception would provide a set of organizing principles that are lacking in existing scholarship. Nothing happens online that does not involve one or more intermediaries—the service providers who facilitate all digital commerce and communication by providing the hardware and software through which all interactions take place. This Article advocates a fundamental shift in the nature of cyberspace scholarship towards a law of the “intermediated information exchange,” and explains the benefits of such an approach in developing a more predictable and cohesive body of legal principles to govern cyberspace interactions.

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INTRODUCTION

The January 2012 “blackout protest” against the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) mounted by Wikipedia, Google, and other online service providers\(^1\) brings into sharp relief what is unique about cyberlaw as a legal field. The current SOPA bill\(^2\) is the most recent example of the ongoing battle between market players and lawmakers attempting to delineate the boundaries of legal responsibility for wrongful online conduct. As a longtime casebook author and teacher of cyberlaw, I have struggled, along with many of my colleagues, to provide a cohesive theoretical framework for the study of the subject. In a typical law school course, professors usually start out with general questions related to the nature of cyberspace and the technology’s impact on the development of legal regulation. Invariably this leads to a discussion of Judge Frank H. Easterbrook’s infamous rejection of cyberlaw as nothing more than a cyber “law of the horse” that fails to illuminate the entire law in a meaningful way because it has no unifying features.\(^3\)

What is easy to miss about cyberlaw—and what the battle over SOPA brings to the forefront of the debates—is that the field is, in reality, the law of the intermediated information exchange. All online interactions—social, commercial, academic, artistic—are exchanges of information facilitated by one or more third party intermediaries. These third parties include search engines, payment systems, Internet service providers (ISPs), gaming platforms, social network operators, domain name registrars, and web hosting services. Nothing can happen online that does not involve one or more of these actors. Moreover, it is the struggle to address these actors’ legal role with respect to online wrongs that creates the law and policy challenges that are unique to cyberspace.

The law of cyberspace is in reality the law of the intermediated information exchange transacted on a global stage. This realization suggests that the dual focal points of cyberspace law should be (1) the role and regulation of online intermediaries and (2) associated jurisdictional challenges. This Article sets out a new theoretical framework for cyberlaw that is more cohesive and principled than the

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I. CURRENT CONCEPTIONS OF CYBERLAW

Despite the resilience of cyberlaw as a staple in today’s law school curricula, no one has yet accurately explained the nature of the field. It has been in the face of uncertainties surrounding its boundaries that casebook writers (myself included) began to organize the debate around the infamous “law of the horse” categorization of cyberspace law offered by Judge Frank H. Easterbrook in 1996,5 and the response to Easterbrook penned soon after by eminent cyberspace scholar Professor Lawrence Lessig.6

In remarks prepared following an invitation to comment on property law in cyberspace in the 1990s, Judge Easterbrook likened cyberspace law to a cyber “law of the horse.”7 He noted that courses involving the cross-sterilization of more than one field, such as law and technology, tended to offer the worst of both worlds.8 They were doomed to be taught by professors who knew little about either field.9 He further opined that the most effective way to learn laws as they apply to specialized endeavors is to study rules of general application.10 Otherwise, any new field that emerged would lack unifying principles that might illuminate anything meaningful about the law more generally.11

4. See discussion infra Part I.
5. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207–08.
7. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 207–08.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
In his oft-cited response to Judge Easterbrook, Professor Lessig claimed that cyberlaw did, in fact, “illuminate the entire law,” although not in the way Judge Easterbrook described.\textsuperscript{12} Professor Lessig acknowledged that—as a matter of substance—cyberlaw might be conceived as a series of disconnected tort, contract, and intellectual property problems.\textsuperscript{13} However, he noted that “there is an important general point that comes from thinking in particular about how law and cyberspace connect.”\textsuperscript{14} This general point was not about the \textit{substance} of the law as it might be applied in cyberspace, but rather “about the \textit{limits on law as a regulator}.”\textsuperscript{15}

Professor Lessig utilized this insight as a springboard for his well-known work on the application of multiple regulatory modalities to cyberspace. These modalities include law, social norms, markets, and system architecture.\textsuperscript{16} Professor Lessig’s work has emphasized the significance of system architecture, or software code, as the key regulatory modality for cyberspace. He has noted that online behavior can be more or less completely and almost perfectly regulated by software code to an extent that could never be paralleled by legal rules, which are often poorly understood and imperfectly enforced.\textsuperscript{17}

The tendency to focus cyberlaw scholarship on the Easterbrook–Lessig debate in subsequent years has become problematic for two reasons. The first is that it effectively freezes the debate within conceptions of the Internet as it existed in the early to mid-1990s. Subsequent scholars have made little attempt to move the debate towards more modern conceptions of the Internet. In other words, the debate as framed today tends to lack the benefit of hindsight, the ability

\textsuperscript{12} Lessig, supra note 6, at 502.

\textsuperscript{13} \textit{Id.} (“Courses in law school, Easterbrook argued, ‘should be limited to subjects that could illuminate the entire law.’ ‘[T]he best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeavors,’ he argued, ‘is to study general rules.’ This ‘the law of cyberspace,’ conceived of as torts in cyberspace, contracts in cyberspace, property in cyberspace, etc., was not.”) (citations omitted).

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{15} \textit{Id.} (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Id.} at 507–08 (identifying these four modalities of regulation in both physical world and cyberspace contexts).

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Id.} at 514 (“I argued that whether cyberspace can be regulated is not a function of Nature. It depends, instead, upon its architecture, or its code. Its \textit{regulability}, that is, is a function of its design.”); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, \textit{Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology}, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 553, 555–56 (1998) (“This Article argues, in essence, that the set of rules for information flows imposed by technology and communication networks form a ‘Lex Informatica’ that policymakers must understand, consciously recognize, and encourage. . . . [P]olicymakers can and should look to Lex Informatica as a useful extra-legal instrument that may be used to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge conventional laws and attempts by governments to regulate across jurisdictional lines.”).
to look at what the Internet has become and what unique legal issues have arisen in cyberspace since Judge Easterbrook and Professor Lessig presented their early comments.

The second drawback of relying on the Easterbrook–Lessig debate as an organizing focus for the modern study of cyberlaw is that such an approach tends to polarize scholars into two camps: those who believe that cyberlaw is not really a field of law at all, and those who believe that cyberlaw is a field that involves the complex interplay of multiple regulatory modalities of which software code is perhaps the most significant. While aspects of each point of view are undoubtedly correct, scholars have tended to avoid developing alternate explanations for cyberspace law.

Paradoxically, in the meantime, other important areas of cyberlaw scholarship have evolved, including a body of literature about the extent to which spatial metaphors derived from the physical world could—or should—be meaningfully applied to cyberspace. Another ongoing debate has focused on the regulatory competence of domestic governments over the Internet. Important as these bodies of scholarship have unquestionably become, they do not answer the most foundational questions about the nature and contours of cyberlaw as a legal field.

This Article argues that scholars can, and should, revisit the debate about the nature of cyberlaw with the benefit of hindsight which is the ability to examine pertinent legal developments and marketplace advances since the early Easterbrook–Lessig debates. Common unifying threads for the field have emerged if one is prepared to tease them out. They arise from the fact that the Internet is a global communications

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18. See sources cited supra note 17.
forum above all else and that all Internet interaction must be facilitated by third party intermediaries. Thus, a conception of cyberlaw that
focuses on its global nature and on the role of these intermediaries will provide the unified framework that Easterbrook felt was lacking in
1996.

Additionally, while Professor Lessig was undoubtedly correct in conceiving of cyberlaw as involving an interaction between various
online regulatory modalities—including laws, social norms, market
forces, and software code—there is still a need within the literature for
a conception of cyberlaw that focuses on the legal aspect of this
equation. In the real world, law always interacts with other modes of
regulation. Our behavior in the tangible universe is constrained as much
by physical fences and walls, as well as social mores, as it is by legal
rules. This is no different in cyberspace, other than the fact that the
precise content of the norms and the nature of the system constraints
may vary online from those in the real world.

It is imperative that scholars engage with Internet law as a specific
endeavor outside the interaction of law with other modes of online
regulation. Professor Lessig and others may be correct in suggesting
that system architecture is a more effective regulator of online behavior
than legal rules. But that is no reason not to develop the legal rules
appropriately within the context of a more cohesive theoretical
framework. In the real world, prison bars and guards with guns provide
more effective constraints on the behavior of convicted criminals than
sentencing laws. But that is no reason not to maintain a body of
sentencing law.

The aim of this Article is to renew and refocus debates on the nature
of cyberlaw. The key features of the Internet for the purposes of this
discussion are: (a) all online conduct involves information exchange as
opposed to physical contact; (b) all online communications are

22. Lessig, supra note 6, at 507–08.
23. See id. (‘‘And finally, there is a fourth feature of real space that regulates behavior—
‘architecture.’ By ‘architecture’ I mean the physical world as we find it, even if ‘as we find it’ is
simply how it has already been made. That a highway divides two neighborhoods limits the
extent to which the neighborhoods integrate. That a town has a square, easily accessible with a
diversity of shops, increases the integration of residents in that town. That Paris has large
boulevards limits the ability of revolutionaries to protest. That the Constitutional Court in
Germany is in Karlsruhe, while the capital is in Berlin, limits the influence of one branch of
government over the other. These constraints function in a way that shapes behavior. In
this way, they too regulate.”).
25. The information exchange is made possible by hardware and by electrons passing
through cables, but my suggested focus for cyberlaw is on the informational qualities of the
exchange rather than the hardware. A good discussion of confusion between hardware and
content-based analyses of the Internet that plagued early discussions of Internet law can be
facilitated by one or more Internet intermediaries such as ISPs, search engines, gaming platforms, and payment systems; and (c) most online interaction has at least the potential for global reach.

No one can interact online without contracting with an ISP. The Internet experience is only meaningful in terms of interactions, all of which must be facilitated by intermediaries such as Facebook, Flickr, MySpace, Shutterfly, Amazon, or Google. Internet intermediaries appear at many points within and are necessary to enable all online experiences.

The fact that everything on the Internet may be described as an intermediated information exchange ultimately sets the parameters for cyberlaw, and sets cyberlaw apart as a distinct legal field. Understanding cyberlaw means understanding the nature and regulation of an information exchange involving more than just the originator and the recipient of a communication. One must further consider the impact of the global nature of the Internet on all of these issues. As most Internet disputes have the potential to raise jurisdictional concerns, there is a high risk within cyberlaw that the prominence of jurisdictional issues will detract from the development of substantive legal rules. The remainder of the discussion now turns to these issues.

II. INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES

Reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a law of intermediated information exchange clarifies the legal issues raised by online interactions. By shifting focus to Internet intermediaries, scholars and regulators can better understand cyberlaw as an integrated field.

A. Defining Internet Intermediaries

For the purposes of this discussion, Internet intermediaries include any service provider that enables online interaction through either paid

30. Amazon is an iconic early experiment in electronic commerce that started as a book and music retailer online and has grown to expand into various kinds of online marketplaces. See AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com (last visited June 11, 2012).
subscription or general availability to the public. These intermediaries maintain distinct business models. They may make their money through subscription fees, through collecting user information and marketing it to other parties, through advertising, or through a combination of these approaches. However, the common feature is that they enable and facilitate online communications in many spheres—commercial, personal, social, artistic, academic, etc.

Without intermediaries, no one could go online or do much of anything by way of online activity. Intermediaries thus play a powerful and important role. Where one intermediary holds a dominant position in a relevant niche—such as Google for online search or Facebook for social networking—the power of that intermediary may warrant significant scrutiny.

Identifying the role of Internet intermediaries in terms of their legal responsibilities is in many ways the foundational challenge of cyberlaw. The legal challenges that are unique to cyberspace law and that differentiate cyberlaw from other fields arise from the ways in which, and the extent to which, legislatures and courts are prepared to impose liability on intermediaries for online conduct initiated by others. The focal position of intermediaries within cyberlaw is further emphasized by the power these intermediaries can wield over the user experience through their ability to control the software code that enables online interaction and their ability to monitor online conduct.

Intermediaries can control the user experience by regulating initial user access through passwords and other encryption technologies. Additionally, they can control and monitor all aspects of the user experience on their platforms by manipulating the underlying software code. For example, an avatar in Second Life can only be—and do—what the software will support. Initially, Second Life did not provide skin colors for avatars outside the Caucasian range. The game now

32. See Jacqueline D. Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”: Developing a Privacy Paradigm for Digital Video, 95 IOWA L. REV. 919, 931–32 (2010) [hereinafter Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi”] (distinguishing between closed networks that require individual membership and open networks that are generally accessible to the public).


34. See discussion infra Section II.C.

35. See sources cited supra note 177.

36. Second Life is a virtual world where users can socialize with other users through online alter egos called avatars. See SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com (last visited June 11, 2012).
supports the creation of additional tones—or “skins”\(^{37}\)—for participants who want their avatars to appear as African-American, Native American, or Asian-American. Presumably, though, if Linden Laboratories, the creators of Second Life, objected to the creation of different skin colors, they could disable features of the software that allow users to create such skins. Intermediaries are the most effective “choke points” for enforcing desired norms of behavior online through their own policies, through the enforcement of legal rules, or through a combination of both.\(^{38}\) Judicial orders directed at intermediaries are much more likely to result in effective relief to plaintiffs than orders against often globally dispersed, impecunious private actors with limited, to no, control over the flow of harmful information once it has been uploaded to a website.\(^{39}\) An order requiring a major online intermediary—such as Facebook or YouTube—to remove defamatory or copyright infringing content, for example, is much more likely to be effective in practice than an attempt to seek out any number of private individuals in various jurisdictions who may be responsible for posting the infringing content in the first place.\(^{40}\)

**B. Direct Versus Indirect Liability for Internet Intermediaries**

The power and prominence of intermediaries underscore the importance of regulating these entities as a focal point for cyberlaw. By the same token, it is important that intermediaries, particularly those providing novel services, are not overregulated to the point that online innovation is chilled. Lawmakers are routinely faced with difficult questions involving the regulation of powerful, and often highly innovative, intermediaries. These questions include determining when an intermediary should be held liable for harmful online conduct instigated by another. Increasingly, Congress has drafted laws aimed specifically at the role of online intermediaries in an attempt to create clearer \textit{ex ante} guidelines to balance technological innovation against the need to protect existing legal rights such as copyright, trademarks,

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38. See Lipton, \textit{“We, the Paparazzi,”} \textit{supra} note 322, at 936–41 (evaluating rules of conduct promulgated by online service providers and limitations to their effective enforcement).

39. Jacqueline Lipton, \textit{Combating Cyber-Victimization}, \textsc{26 Berkeley Tech. L.J.} 1103, 1139 (2011) [hereinafter Lipton, \textit{Cyber-Victimization}] (“Laws per se suffer from difficulties of identifying an anonymous or pseudonymous defendant and having effective jurisdictional reach over the defendant. . . Even if plaintiffs can identify their defendants—which may require an expensive and time-consuming court order—they are often judgment-proof.”).

40. A court order against an intermediary will not be a perfect solution given the tendency for information to jump from website to website online, but it will be more effective than an order against one or more private individuals.
personal reputations, etc. Obvious examples include the ISP safe harbor provisions in the Copyright Act41 and the Communications Decency Act, respectively,42 as well as the contentious provisions in SOPA.43

The problem with many current cyberlaw texts is that questions of intermediary liability are scattered throughout chapters focusing on specific kinds of tortious liability—copyright, trademark, defamation, etc. This organization tends to discourage a focus on the central question involving the rights and obligations of intermediaries across discrete subject matter areas. Questions about intermediary liability for copyright infringement are found in a textbook chapter on copyright law, while intermediary liability for defamation or privacy is typically discussed in a free speech, privacy, or general tort chapter. It would make much more sense for discussions of intermediary liability to be considered together across all relevant fields of law—copyright, trademark, defamation, privacy, bullying, harassment, etc. Taking this approach, important synergies inherent in the role of intermediaries could be drawn out, and more consistent and predictable legal rules could be developed.

For example, one question that plagues cyberlaw is the increasing difficulty inherent in ascertaining when an intermediary should be held primarily, as opposed to secondarily, liable for an online wrong. When a wrong is committed in the physical world—such as theft, conversion, negligence, or battery—the identity of the primary wrongdoer is usually readily apparent, and it is usually not an intermediary. Even if a third party facilitates the wrong, the actual wrongdoer is generally easy enough to distinguish from that third party. If I steal from you and deposit the proceeds in my bank account, the bank may be secondarily liable for some aspects of my conduct44 and may be subject to a garnishment order in relation to the stolen funds.45 However, it is clear that the bank—the intermediary—is not the primary wrongdoer. I am.

Online, however, it is often difficult to discern who is most appropriately identified as the primary wrongdoer. In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.,46 for example, it was unclear to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

41 17 U.S.C. § 512(a), (c) (2006); see also discussion infra Section II.C.
42 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006); see also discussion infra Section II.C.
44 See, e.g., William Blair, Secondary Liability of Financial Institutions for the Fraud of Third Parties, 30 HONG KONG L.J. 74 (2000) (noting the basis upon which secondary liability is often imposed on banks and financial institutions in British-based common law systems).
46 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).
whether the Netscape search engine should be regarded as a primary, or as a secondary infringer of Playboy’s trademarks.\textsuperscript{47} Netscape’s advertising system allowed its paying advertisers to link their advertisements to terms pre-identified by Netscape as common search terms in the advertiser’s field. Thus, a dog food company might pay to have its advertisements keyed to search results when an Internet user enters a search query related to dogs.\textsuperscript{48}

Playboy complained that Netscape included Playboy’s trademarked terms “playboy” and “playmate” for keying advertisements related to adult entertainment.\textsuperscript{49} Some of the resulting advertisements were not clearly labeled as to whether they were officially related to Playboy’s business.\textsuperscript{50} An Internet user clicking on an ad might incorrectly assume he or she was dealing with Playboy rather than an unaffiliated entity providing similar services. A successful trademark infringement action requires consumers of a product or service to be confused about the source of that product or service.\textsuperscript{51} Playboy thus claimed infringement with respect to the ambiguously presented advertisements keyed to the terms “playboy” and “playmate.”

While ultimately holding Netscape liable for infringement, the Ninth Circuit judges were unsure about whether Netscape was best described as a primary or a secondary infringer of Playboy’s trademarks.\textsuperscript{52} In many ways, secondary liability for Internet intermediaries makes sense in most contexts. Intermediaries, by definition, are third parties who facilitate activities between principal actors.

Online, however, the lines are blurred between primary and secondary actors, largely because intermediaries physically control the software code that enables primary actors to engage in wrongful online conduct. The Ninth Circuit in \textit{Playboy} did not resolve the issue of primary versus secondary liability, holding that Netscape was liable for infringement on either basis so there was no need to determine which

\textsuperscript{47} Id. at 1024.

\textsuperscript{48} Id. at 1022–23 (“Keying allows advertisers to target individuals with certain interests by linking advertisements to pre-identified terms. To take an innocuous example, a person who searches for a term related to gardening may be a likely customer for a company selling seeds. Thus, a seed company might pay to have its advertisement displayed when searchers enter terms related to gardening.”).

\textsuperscript{49} Id.

\textsuperscript{50} Id. at 1023 (“\textbf{P}laintiff\textsuperscript{f} introduced evidence that the adult-oriented banner ads displayed on defendants’ search results pages are often graphic in nature and are confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.”).

\textsuperscript{51} Id. at 1024 (“The ‘core element of trademark infringement,’ the likelihood of confusion, lies at the center of this case.”).

\textsuperscript{52} Id. (“T\textsl{he} parties dispute whether a direct or a contributory theory of liability applies to defendants’ actions. We conclude that defendants are potentially liable under one theory and that we need not decide which one.”).
One could convincingly argue either way. It is easy to suggest that the advertisers competing with the plaintiff were primarily liable for infringement because they were the ones who drafted the confusing ads that were keyed to the plaintiff’s trademarks. Alternatively, one could argue that Netscape should be primarily liable because of its choice of the keywords it coded into the system and its broadcasting of the confusing advertisements in the search results.

While the characterization of Netscape as a primary or secondary infringer had no practical impact on the decision in this case, in other cases the question of primary versus secondary liability for Internet intermediaries has taken on greater significance. For example, in Cartoon Network v. CSC Holdings, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was tasked with ascertaining whether the provider of an interactive digital video recorder (DVR) was primarily or secondarily liable for copyright infringement with respect to content copied to its servers at its customers’ request.

Like Playboy, the facts of Cartoon Network are unique to cyberspace. They simply could not have arisen in the context of pre-digital video recording technologies. In the good old days of Betamax and VHS tape recorders, it was clear that any primary infringements—unauthorized copies of protected content—were made by owners of video recorders. The providers of the copying technology were not involved in the primary infringements because they did not decide which programs were recorded, when they were being recorded, or how often they were being recorded. The providers did not even know which programs were being recorded by their customers.

These pre-digital intermediaries merely provided the technology that enabled copying. The United States Supreme Court in 1984 stated as much in the seminal case of Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., holding that Sony, as the manufacturer of the Betamax video tape recorder, might be held secondarily liable for infringements of copyrighted works carried out by its customers if the customers were primary infringers. The court found no primary infringement on the

53. Id. ("Whether the defendants are directly or merely contributorily liable proves to be a tricky question. However, we need not decide that question here. We conclude that defendants are either directly or contributorily liable. Under either theory, [plaintiff’s] case may proceed. Thus, we need not decide this issue.").

54. 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).

55. Id. at 130.


57. Id.

58. Id. at 446.
customers’ part by virtue of the application of the fair use defense.\textsuperscript{59}

However, in \textit{Cartoon Network}, the Second Circuit faced a new problem of consumer copying in the digital context, with technology now enabling copying to occur remotely over a network. The DVR service in \textit{Cartoon Network} mimicked the functionality of the analog video recorder under consideration in \textit{Sony}, but technically, it operated quite differently. As with a set-top video recorder, the DVR service provided by the defendant, Cablevision, allowed its customers to record programs from the television. However, unlike analog recorders, Cablevision’s service enabled copies to be made remotely and stored on Cablevision’s servers.\textsuperscript{60} Thus, Cablevision itself physically made the infringing copies of protected television programs at its customers’ request and stored them on its own servers.\textsuperscript{61}

The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Cablevision was not a direct copyright infringer.\textsuperscript{62} According to the court, if there was any infringement, it was by the users of the service, who effectively made the copies by ordering Cablevision’s servers to record them.\textsuperscript{63} These users, though, are unlikely to be held liable as direct infringers because of the \textit{Sony} decision. In \textit{Sony}, the Supreme Court held that television audiences did not infringe copyrights when they recorded programs for later viewing.\textsuperscript{64} This practice was labeled “time shifting” and was considered by a majority of the Supreme Court to be a fair use of the copyrighted work.\textsuperscript{65} Assuming that Cablevision’s customers were largely engaged in time shifting, the Second Circuit was correct in suggesting that there was no primary infringement for which Cablevision could be secondarily liable.\textsuperscript{66}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{59} \textit{Id.} at 454–55 (holding that the copying by owners of DVRs was authorized time shifting and thus covered by the fair use defense to copyright infringement).

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Cartoon Network}, 536 F.3d at 124–25 (describing the operation of Cablevision’s remote DVR system).

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Id.} at 133 (“We conclude only that on the facts of this case, copies produced by the RS-DVR system are ‘made’ by the RS-DVR customer, and Cablevision’s contribution to this reproduction by providing the system does not warrant the imposition of direct liability.”).

\textsuperscript{63} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{64} \textit{Sony}, 464 U.S. at 456 (“One may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected representatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have enacted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying possible.”).

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Id.} at 454–55 (“[W]e must conclude that this record amply supports the District Court’s conclusion that home time-shifting is fair use.”).

\textsuperscript{66} \textit{Cartoon Network}, 536 F.3d at 130 (“The question is who made this copy. If it is Cablevision, plaintiffs’ theory of direct infringement succeeds; if it is the customer, plaintiffs’ theory fails because Cablevision would then face, at most, secondary liability, a theory of liability expressly disavowed by plaintiffs.”).
\end{flushleft}
While this result seems logical, the Second Circuit had to go to some lengths in its reasoning to avoid finding Cablevision liable as a direct infringer. Unlike Sony with its old Betamax video recorders, it was Cablevision that made the actual copies of protected works, at its customers’ instigation. Moreover, unauthorized reproduction of protected works attracts strict liability under the Copyright Act.67

The Second Circuit avoided the direct infringement result largely by reading a volition requirement into the Copyright Act that does not literally appear in the statute.68 Following an earlier Internet intermediary copyright case, the Second Circuit again chipped away at the strict liability basis of copyright infringement in order to reach the desired result, a result that was consistent with the spirit of the earlier Sony case, if not the technical reality.69

Questions of primary versus secondary liability for intermediaries come up again and again in different online contexts70 and are often resolved inconsistently, partly due to the failure of judges and scholars to focus on synergies between the role of intermediaries across different fields of law. The cyberlaw of the future should focus on the role of the

67. JOHN TEHRANIAN, INFRINGEMENT NATION: COPYRIGHT 2.0 AND YOU 13 (2011) (“copyright law is a strict liability regime with no mens rea requirement for liability”).

68. Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 131 (“When there is a dispute as to the author of an allegedly infringing instance of reproduction, Netcom and its progeny direct our attention to the volitional conduct that causes the copy to be made. There are only two instances of volitional conduct in this case: Cablevision’s conduct in designing, housing, and maintaining a system that exists only to produce a copy, and a customer’s conduct in ordering that system to produce a copy of a specific program. In the case of a VCR, it seems clear—and we know of no case holding otherwise—that the operator of the VCR, the person who actually presses the button to make the recording, supplies the necessary element of volition, not the person who manufactures, maintains, or, if distinct from the operator, owns the machine. We do not believe that an RS-DVR customer is sufficiently distinguishable from a VCR user to impose liability as a direct infringer on a different party for copies that are made automatically upon that customer’s command.”); see also Jacqueline D. Lipton, Cyberspace, Exceptionalism, and Innocent Copyright Infringement, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 767, 791 (2011) (“The Cartoon Network court employed an approach adopted in at least one earlier Internet case involving individual copying that had been enabled by an Internet service provider. The earlier case had imposed a ‘volition’ requirement in the context of direct infringement. In other words, the plaintiff needed to prove that the defendant’s conduct was volitional rather than a largely automated technological process. This volition requirement may be seen as a judicial gloss on strict liability to accommodate technological innovation.”).


70. See, e.g., Cartoon Network, 536 F.3d at 130 (discussing primary versus secondary liability of video recording service provider in the copyright infringement context); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162–63 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing whether an online housemate matching service could be held primarily liable for content posted by customers that allegedly infringed fair housing legislation); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2004) (discussing primary versus secondary liability of search engine in the trademark infringement context).
Internet intermediary to enable discussions about primary versus secondary liability to be examined consistently within a cohesive theoretical framework across discrete areas of law. It may be that a general presumption of secondary, rather than primary, liability makes sense for intermediaries because of their nature as “middlemen” for facilitating the conduct of others. However, even within the context of secondary liability for intermediaries, significant challenges arise.

C. Questions of Secondary Liability

In the early days of the Internet, legal questions about intermediary liability tended to revolve around ISPs that provided bulletin boards and other basic communication forums. Litigants asked courts whether providers of such forums could be held liable for content posted by their members and, if so, on what basis. The most common claims in the late 1990s related to defamation and copyright.

In the absence of a unified cyberlaw field focusing on ISP liability issues in the 1990s, courts and legislators took a narrow approach to questions of ISP liability, considering each situation largely within the context of the distinct legal wrong involved. Thus, lawmakers may have missed critical points in the development of Internet law that they could have used to ensure a systematic consideration of principles of Internet intermediary liability. The law on ISP liability for defamation and copyright evolved, first through common law and later through legislation, in a piecemeal fashion. Today it is difficult to reconcile the principles of ISP liability for defamation with those of ISP liability for copyright infringement.

In early defamation cases, for example, courts generally exempted ISPs from liability for defamatory comments posted by others provided that the ISP had not itself exercised significant editorial control over the content. This soon proved problematic because it effectively penalized


72. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 138 (considering liability of ISP for allegedly defamatory content posted by its customers); Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *2 (considering liability of ISP for allegedly defamatory comments posted by customers).

73. See cases cited supra note 71.

74. See Cubby, 776 F. Supp. at 141 (holding ISP was not liable for defamatory content posted by others); Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, at *5 (holding ISP liable for
ISPs that were attempting to “do the right thing” and censor inappropriate conduct. The more active the ISP was in, say, protecting children from harmful material, the more likely it was to attract legal liability. ISPs that turned a blind eye to the content of communications were more likely to escape legal liability than those that were proactive about monitoring content.

Congress eventually intervened, enacting Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA). This section, in relevant part, provides that: “No provider . . . of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.” Courts interpreted this provision as almost blanket immunity for ISPs with respect to defamatory comments posted by others. In one case, an ISP was exempted from liability even though it had contracted with a columnist to contribute provocative content that it knew was likely to be defamatory. In another case, an ISP was held to be immune where it had been made aware of damaging false comments and had failed to remove them in a timely fashion. To date, ISPs have only been held liable as information content providers under Section 230 where they have actually written the relevant content themselves.

The current position on ISP liability for defamation differs dramatically from the current position on ISP liability for copyright infringement. Initially, when Internet users posted copyrighted content on bulletin boards, courts struggled to determine whether the ISPs that provided the forums should be held liable for those infringements.
Ultimately, Congress stepped in to ensure that ISPs were not held liable for copyright infringement when they were acting as mere conduits or repositories for the postings of others.83

Congress enacted the Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act (OCILLA) as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) package of 1998. OCILLA provides a safe harbor for ISPs in cases of non-volitional or non-willful copying: In other words, copying that occurs as part of a purely technical or mechanical process that was initiated by another person.$\textsuperscript{84}$ The statute also exempts ISPs from liability where the ISP had no actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, had not directly benefited from the infringement, and had responded expeditiously to a request to remove infringing content.$\textsuperscript{85}$

The ISP safe harbors for defamation and copyright were enacted around the same time.$\textsuperscript{86}$ However, the respective statutes clearly follow different approaches. This result is not surprising given that the drafters of OCILLA were focused on amending the Copyright Act for the digital age, while the drafters of the CDA were dealing with a broader statute designed to protect children from harmful material online.$\textsuperscript{87}$ Both statutes were incredibly challenging to draft,$\textsuperscript{88}$ particularly in the early days of the Internet when it was unclear how relevant technologies would develop, how people would use them, and indeed what role Internet intermediaries would ultimately play in monitoring online communications.

Nonetheless, the statutes shared significant commonalities in aim, at least in the case of the ISP safe harbor provisions. Drafters of both statutes were faced with the emerging role of the Internet intermediary and with questions about the impact of imposing liability on intermediaries for wrongs committed by others. However, each drafting group understandably focused on its own brief without examining the nature of ISP liability more generally.

84. Id.
85. Id. § 512(c). The statute also exempts ISPs from liability for system caching—temporary housing of copies of digital information. Id. § 512(b).
86. Section 230 of the CDA was enacted in 1996 while OCILLA was enacted in 1998.
87. Lukmire, supra note 78, at 373–75 (describing the legislative history of the Communications Decency Act as an attempt to constitutionally incentivize website operators to police the Internet and to prevent minors from accessing harmful content).
88. In fact, significant portions of the CDA (other than section 230) failed to pass constitutional muster in the face of First Amendment challenges. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (striking down other sections of the legislation for creating impermissibly overbroad constraints on online communication).
In the final analysis, it is possible to reconcile the approaches taken by Congress respectively in OCILLA and in Section 230 of the CDA, although the reconciliation may be somewhat unsatisfying as an ex post facto rationalization. For example, one might argue that it is easier for an ISP to have knowledge of a copyright infringement than of the veracity of a defamation claim, because copyrights are generally registered, and because OCILLA requires the claimant to give detailed notice to the ISP of a copyright claim. Thus, it is arguably reasonable to hold ISPs liable for copyright infringement on the basis of notice but to exempt them from defamation liability regardless of notice. It is at least theoretically much easier for an ISP to make a reasonable judgment about the veracity of a copyright claim than about the legitimacy of a defamation claim.

Of course, one could argue that if an ISP is not in a good position to make decisions about the merits of a defamation claim, then the ISP should err on the side of protecting the claimant’s reputation and should be exposed to liability if it fails to act. However, this opens intermediaries up to potentially frivolous claims that cannot be easily verified. If an intermediary is required to act on each claim by removing offending material—or at least investigating the merits—the resulting costs to those service providers may be prohibitive. There is no easy way for an ISP to determine whether posted comments are defamatory or not, as opposed to a copyright claim where registration of a copyright is at least prima facie evidence of its validity.

In all contexts, Internet intermediaries are routinely put in the unenviable position of either erring on the side of facilitating the free flow of ideas online or of monitoring and policing content. Where the content involves potentially infringing on rights, the existence of which can be relatively easily verified by the intermediary, it might be reasonable to impose liability on the intermediary if it fails to act. In other circumstances, liability might be less appropriate absent a showing of complicity by the intermediary in the wrongful conduct.

One might criticize the different approaches taken between OCILLA and Section 230 of the CDA. In fact, it is interesting that there is so little commentary on the comparison between the two approaches in current literature. In both defamation and copyright claims, ISPs have been put into the position of making difficult decisions about whether or not to act in the face of a complaint. In both cases they have had to examine

89. TEHRANIAN, supra note 67, at 98 (noting the necessity of registering copyrighted works in the United States in order to obtain meaningful judicial relief for infringement).
91. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, 273 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that registration of a copyright “confers prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright”).
the extent to which they might be regarded as complicit in the alleged wrong. And in both cases they have been put in the position of making decisions that impact free expression: that is, to remove content and risk being criticized for censorship or to allow allegedly infringing content and risk being sued as complicit in the commission of an online wrong. However, Congress acted in a way that misses these synergies, taking one approach with respect to copyrights and another with respect to defamation and other harmful content.

D. Benefits of a Renewed Focus on Intermediary Liability

Refocusing the cyberlaw field as a law of the intermediated information exchange would create an effective theoretical framework within which to investigate the commonalities between facially disparate areas of law like intermediary liability for defamation and for copyright infringement. There is a pressing need to develop such a theoretical framework. New issues of intermediary liability are constantly arising, often requiring novel applications of existing legal principles.92

The lack of a coherent theoretical framework governing the liability of Internet intermediaries for online wrongs is exemplified in debates over SOPA.93 The bill grants the attorney general the power to bring actions against owners of websites that host content that infringes on American intellectual property rights.94 It also imposes significant obligations on online service providers to comply with court orders made in accordance with the legislation.95 These obligations include increased policing and monitoring of content transmitted via their services.96 The new legal duties, if implemented, would place new burdens on service providers including search engines,97 online payment systems,98 and online advertising services.99

While this legislation is aimed at the protection of intellectual property rights in particular, it covers in general the same issues that arise in relation to the enforcement of other laws in cyberspace. It deals

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92. See Lowe, supra note 33, at 213 (“From patent, copyright, and trademark infringement to click fraud to wrongful dismissal, Google spends a lot of time in court. While it is true that Google makes a large target, it also is true . . . that it is operating in a field littered with uncertainties begging to be resolved in the courts of law. Some of the lawsuits address key issues that could define both Google and the Internet of the future.”).
93. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 1.
95. See id. § 102(c)(2).
96. See id.
97. Id. § 102(c)(2)(B).
98. Id. § 102(c)(2)(C).
99. Id. § 102(c)(2)(D).
with finding an appropriate framework for imposing legal obligations on online service providers with respect to wrongs committed by others. The drafters of this bill, like the drafters of the legislation described in Section II.C., are faced with the competing aims of encouraging online innovation and preventing online harm. Additionally, as with the CDA and OCILLA, the drafters of SOPA have latched onto the reality that online service providers can be the most effective choke points in online interaction to interrupt the flow of infringing or harmful communications.

Lobbyists for free speech and privacy rights argue that SOPA strikes the balance too heavily in favor of protecting proprietary content and will negatively impact the online marketplace of information and ideas. Those representing the digital content industries take the position that legislation aimed at blocking the online flow of infringing content is necessary to protect innovation in digital content production and distribution. As with the CDA and OCILLA, under SOPA, the online intermediaries effectively become the meat in the sandwich between those who advocate for free speech and privacy rights and those who seek to prevent intellectual property infringement. A more comprehensive and cohesive theoretical framework within which to consider the appropriate role for online service providers in these contexts would be extremely helpful in furthering more balanced drafting of legislation such as SOPA.

Of course, SOPA has been drafted in its current form in the context of existing case law dealing with the role of online intermediaries for the intellectual property infringements of others. This case law may not have given Congress particularly effective guidance in drafting legislation aimed at balancing online information flow against the need to prevent widespread copyright infringement. Two relatively recent decisions handed down by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit prior to the drafting of SOPA went in two different directions on the potential copyright infringement liability of an Internet search engine and a group of electronic payment system providers, respectively.

The respective defendants were the Google search engine in one case and the Visa online payment system in the other. The plaintiff in each case was Perfect 10, a company that sold photos of nude models

100. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 1 (“Information is the currency of democracy, and people will not sit still as moneyed interests try to deny them access.”).
101. See id. (describing the aims of the legislation from the point of view of copyright holders).
102. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
103. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv., Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
In the litigation against Google, Perfect 10 claimed copyright infringement with respect to unauthorized reproductions and displays of its copyrighted photographs that showed up in Google’s search results. Perfect 10 claimed both direct and indirect infringement, arguing that Google should be held responsible for its own reproductions and displays of the copyrighted photographs in its search engine results. It argued that Google should also be held secondarily liable for the infringements by the people who had actually made the illegal copies in the first place—the copies that had shown up in search results. In the litigation against Visa, Perfect 10 claimed only secondary liability with respect to Visa’s enabling payments to companies that sold unauthorized reproductions of Perfect 10’s protected photographs.

With respect to the secondary liability claims, the Ninth Circuit ultimately held that Google could potentially be contributorily liable for the copyright infringements, but that there were factual matters to reconsider on remand. With respect to Visa, however, the court held that there was no secondary liability because Visa’s activities were too far removed from the primary infringements to be regarded as

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104. See Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1157 (“Perfect 10 markets and sells copyrighted images of nude models. Among other enterprises, it operates a subscription website on the Internet. Subscribers pay a monthly fee to view Perfect 10 images in a ‘members’ area’ of the site.”).
105. Id. at 1159 (“Perfect 10 claims that Google’s search engine program directly infringes two exclusive rights granted to copyright holders: its display rights and its distribution rights.”).
106. Id. at 1163 (noting that plaintiff had succeeded in establishing a prima facie case that Google had infringed its copyrights by reproducing copyrighted photographs as thumbnail images). But see id. at 1168 (holding that Google’s reproductions of the images as thumbnails in its search engine results page was a fair use and therefore non-infringing).
107. Id. at 1170 (describing the need to evaluate “Perfect 10’s arguments that Google is secondarily liable in light of the direct infringement that is undisputed by the parties: third-party websites’ reproducing, displaying, and distributing unauthorized copies of Perfect 10’s images on the Internet”).
108. Visa, 494 F.3d at 792 (“[Perfect 10] sued Visa International Service Association, MasterCard International Inc., and several affiliated banks and data processing services (collectively, the Defendants), alleging secondary liability under federal copyright . . . law . . . . It sued because Defendants continue to process credit card payments to websites that infringe Perfect 10’s intellectual property rights after being notified by Perfect 10 of infringement by those websites.”).
109. Amazon, 508 F.3d at 1172–73 (“Google could be held contributorily liable if it had knowledge that infringing Perfect 10 images were available using its search engine, could take simple measures to prevent further damage to Perfect 10’s copyrighted works, and failed to take such steps. The district court did not resolve the factual disputes over the adequacy of Perfect 10’s notices to Google and Google’s responses to these notices. Moreover, there are factual disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district court for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that Google was contributorily liable . . . .”).
contributing to those infringements. In distinguishing the Google case, the court noted in Visa that “[t]he salient distinction is that Google’s search engine itself assists in the distribution of infringing content to Internet users, while [Visa’s] payment systems do not.” The majority in Visa admitted that Visa assists in making the primary infringements profitable, but they distinguished the profitability of the infringement from the distribution and availability of infringing images online.

Visa included a strong dissent from Judge Alex Kozinski, who argued that the payment system not only provides an economic incentive to infringe, but actually provides “an essential step in the infringement process.” In Judge Kozinski’s view, without the payment systems, infringement would be almost impossible. Clearly, there is room for disagreement about where to draw the secondary liability line when it comes to Internet gatekeepers. An appropriately reconceptualized cyberlaw field would provide a much needed theoretical framework within which to reconsider these issues.

While providing accessible and innovative services to enable individuals to interact more efficiently and effectively, online service providers are subject to the possibility of secondary liability claims for activities about which they have little actual knowledge, including copyright, defamation, trademark infringement, bullying, harassment liability, etc. Courts are likely to be faced with questions about what an intermediary could or should have known about the activities of a primary infringer in a number of these different contexts. These

110. Visa, 494 F.3d at 796 (“The credit card companies cannot be said to materially contribute to the infringement in this case because they have no direct connection to that infringement. Here, the infringement rests on the reproduction, alteration, display and distribution of Perfect 10’s images over the Internet. Perfect 10 has not alleged that any infringing material passes over Defendants’ payment networks or through their payment processing systems, or that Defendants’ systems are used to alter or display the infringing images. . . . While Perfect 10 has alleged that Defendants make it easier for websites to profit from this infringement activity, the issue here is reproduction, alteration, display and distribution, which can occur without payment.”).

111. Id. at 797.

112. Id. (“[Visa] do[es], as alleged, make infringement more profitable, and people are generally more inclined to engage in an activity when it is financially profitable. However, there is an additional step in the causal chain: Google may materially contribute to infringement by making it fast and easy for third parties to locate and distribute infringing material, whereas [Visa] make[s] it easier for infringement to be profitable, which tends to increase financial incentives to infringe, which in turn tends to increase infringement.”).

113. Id. at 812 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).

114. Id. (“My colleagues recognize, as they must, that helping consumers locate infringing content can constitute contributory infringement, but they consign the means of payment to secondary status. . . . But why is locating infringing images more central to infringement than paying for them? If infringing images can’t be found, there can be no infringement; but if infringing images can’t be paid for, there can be no infringement either.”).
questions are not unique to copyright law.

As intermediaries’ business operations continue to scale up, they may be less and less sure of what their users are doing. In remanding the Google case back to the lower court, the Ninth Circuit was mindful that it had insufficient information about the realities of Google’s position to make a meaningful determination on contributory liability for copyright infringement. It only held that liability was possible on this basis, but it wanted the lower court to look more closely at the actual position of Google, and whether Google realistically had the capabilities to detect and prevent copyright infringement.\footnote{115. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2007) (―[T]here are factual disputes over whether there are reasonable and feasible means for Google to refrain from providing access to infringing images. Therefore, we must remand this claim to the district court for further consideration whether Perfect 10 would likely succeed in establishing that Google was contributorily liable for in-line linking to full-size infringing images under the test enunciated today.‖).}

Courts and legislatures will continue to face questions of secondary liability of online intermediaries in copyright infringement cases and in other areas of law as well. However, to date, these issues have been tackled on a subject matter basis. SOPA and OCILLA are both confined to the position of Internet intermediaries with respect to copyright infringements. Section 230 of the CDA, though, considers similar issues with respect to other online conduct such as defamation and other forms of harmful speech outside the intellectual property arena.\footnote{116. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2006) (―Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or expand any law pertaining to intellectual property.‖).}

Current cyberlaw scholars tend to consider each specific question within a vacuum without looking at the role of Internet intermediaries more broadly. As cyberlaw is, in reality, the law of intermediated information exchange, a debate that is refocused more specifically on the role of online intermediaries has a better chance of achieving consistency of application than the current piecemeal approach.

E. Responsibilities to Unmask Online Wrongdoers

Another advantage of refocusing cyberlaw on the role of Internet intermediaries would be that such a move would provide a theoretical paradigm within which to consider the unique role of intermediaries in terms of their potential to unmask online wrongdoers. Internet intermediaries are often the only entity within a dispute capable of identifying or locating an online wrongdoer, even in circumstances where the intermediary itself is not complicit in committing the harm. Much online communication is anonymous or pseudonymous.\footnote{117. Lipton, Cyber-Victimization, supra note 399, at 1114 (―The anonymity provided by the Internet may increase the volume of abusive conduct because it may encourage individuals who would not engage in such conduct offline to do so in the anonymous virtual forum provided by the Internet.‖).} Thus,
victims of online wrongs frequently cannot identify those engaging in harmful conduct.

However, again, the law must strike a delicate balance between ensuring that intermediaries assist in unmasking wrongdoers and avoiding a chilling effect on intermediaries’ business models. If intermediaries are too often and too easily required to identify customers who wish to remain anonymous, this will likely result in a chilling of online activity. This has been one of the most marked criticisms of SOPA, involving the extent to which the legislation would require online service providers to take responsibility for policing online wrongdoers and potentially infringing the privacy and autonomy of their customers in the process.118

There is a delicate balance to be struck between the obligations of Internet intermediaries to law enforcement and to their customer bases.119 Internet users may be loath to communicate online for fear of being unmasked if there is an excessive obligation on intermediaries to police their activities.120 Intermediaries may also falter in the marketplace if they cannot protect their customers’ privacy sufficiently.121 Additionally, the requirement that intermediaries stand ready to unmask their customers imposes costs on intermediaries related to obtaining and maintaining sufficiently detailed records to identify customers when necessary.

To date, courts have developed rules to determine the circumstances under which an Internet intermediary may be ordered to divulge the identity of an alleged defendant122 or a witness to an online wrong.123 In

by the Internet . . . .\).

119. Moreover, as online service providers such as Facebook increasingly become public corporations, they will be faced with additional obligations to shareholders.  
120. See Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1641 (1995) (noting the trend for Internet users to desire to speak without censorship and to take advantage of the Internet’s relative anonymity in doing so).  
121. See id. at 1671 (“The Networld has an abundance of opportunities for full and uninhibited speech. The difficulty has become one of offended parties seeking to inhibit the speech of the offending posters of messages. As the offended turn to their lawyers to redress their grievances, this uninhibited cauldron of opinion becomes threatened. Should strict liability for all electronic transmission become the accepted norm, service providers might scramble to hide behind contracts, waivers, monitoring of all content, and censorship of messages before posting. . . . Liability insurance would be prohibitively expensive, the burden of monitoring all messages before posting them too demanding, and the possibility of facing protracted litigation too onerous.”).  
these cases, judges have had to draw lines that most appropriately balance the interests of an intermediary in protecting its members’ anonymity against the interests of a complainant. Judges have faced these challenges in the context of cases involving copyright infringement, defamation, trademark infringement, and complaints about reputational harm.

A broader look at these questions through the lens of Internet intermediary liability more generally would enable more cohesive and systematic rules to develop over time. The development of clearer rules about the responsibility of intermediaries to maintain and to divulge identifying records about customers would assist in making business more predictable for intermediaries and for their customers. This predictability may also be useful to victims of online wrongs as they would gain a better *ex ante* sense of the likelihood of unmasking a potential defendant or witness in a given situation.

The role of the Internet intermediary is effectively the foundation of cyberlaw, or at least it should be. Intermediaries are necessary for all online interaction. No one can communicate online without using at least one intermediary. As gatekeepers to all we do online, intermediaries hold great power in the sense of enabling access to online communications, setting the parameters of online conduct through their software coding, and maintaining records of the identities of online actors. They can also be the most effective choke points to prevent harmful online interactions.

However, imposing legal responsibilities on intermediaries always comes at a cost. The more duties legally imposed on intermediaries, the more likely the result will be a chilling of online innovation. Reconceptualizing cyberlaw as a field, the primary focus of which is to address these issues, would lead to significant benefits in terms of creating greater certainty for online service providers and their customers with respect to their legal rights and obligations.

III. JURISDICTION

Of course, any reconceptualization of the cyberlaw field should retain some focus on the major jurisdictional challenges created by cyberspace interactions. Again, Internet intermediaries will often be key players in jurisdictional disputes, as they are the parties that enable the global communications and are often the easiest parties for a defendant to locate. Additionally, a court order against an intermediary will likely

125. See, e.g., Am. Online, 52 Va. Cir. at *1.
126. See, e.g., Seeescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. at 575.
127. See, e.g., Doe I, 561 F. Supp. 2d at 251.
be more effective than an order against often multiple individual defendants, because the intermediaries are the choke points for communications. If an intermediary is ordered to remove or monitor the flow of certain information, the result will be more effective than an order against a private defendant who may use aliases or pseudonyms, who may effectively mask his location, and who may likely be judgment-proof.128 When global communications were easily, quickly, and cheaply enabled in the 1990s by the widespread public take-up of the Internet, it seemed obvious that the major new legal issues would be jurisdictional.

The Internet opened up seemingly endless possibilities for litigating against foreign defendants, raising choice of law and choice of forum questions, as well as foreign enforcement challenges.129 Even if a court in the plaintiff’s jurisdiction agreed to exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant and an order was obtained in favor of the plaintiff, it would not always be clear that the order could be enforced in the foreign jurisdiction. Particularly problematic have been cases where the defendant held no assets in the plaintiff’s jurisdiction that could be attached as part of a judgment order. The ongoing litigation between Yahoo! and La Ligue contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme in France is a good example highlighting uncertainties about how, or indeed if, a court order from the plaintiff’s country might be enforced in the defendant’s country.130

In Yahoo!, a French plaintiff successfully obtained a French court order to have Yahoo! enjoined from facilitating sales of Nazi memorabilia in France.131 Subsequently, Yahoo! took up the matter in California and attempted to obtain a declaration from the federal district court that the French order could not be enforced against Yahoo!’s assets in California.132 To date, the courts have refrained from giving a definitive answer to this question.133 The Ninth Circuit has been split on whether the case is ripe for a decision, and as to whether the district

128. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
130. See Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et L’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 2006).
131. Id. at 1202.
132. Id. at 1204.
133. Id. at 1224 (“An eight-judge majority of the en banc panel holds . . . that the district court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over defendants LICRA and UEJF . . . . A three-judge plurality of the panel concludes . . . that the suit is unripe for decision . . . . When the votes of the three judges who conclude that the suit is unripe are combined with the votes of the three dissenting judges who conclude that there is no personal jurisdiction over LICRA and UEJF, there are six votes to dismiss Yahoo!’s suit.”).
court can exercise personal jurisdiction over the French organization.\footnote{134}{Id.}
The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari,\footnote{135}{La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme v. Yahoo! Inc., 547 U.S. 1163 (2006).} so ultimately any decision made will be in the federal district court.

Jurisdictional questions are, of course, not new to cyberspace. However, the Internet raises new challenges for conflicts of law by its very nature. When addressing jurisdictional issues in cyberspace, courts have often complicated their analyses by focusing on the physical hardware aspects of the Internet. For example, at a loss for guidance on how to ascertain whether a defendant purposefully availed herself of the plaintiff’s forum,\footnote{136}{Purposeful availment, a prong of a specific personal jurisdiction inquiry, focuses on the defendant’s activities within the plaintiff’s forum. See, for example, discussion of the concept in Yahoo!, 433 F.3d at 1205–06.} early cyberspace cases tended to focus on the location of physical computer servers.\footnote{137}{See, e.g., Bochan v. La Fontaine, 68 F. Supp. 2d 692, 698–99 (E.D. Va. 1999) (hinging personal jurisdiction on fortuitous location of servers accessed by defendants).} This approach led to random and unpredictable results because of the nature of the Internet’s hardware.\footnote{138}{See Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22, 75 Tul. L. Rev. 87, 94 n.38 (2000) (“The TCP/IP protocols break down information transmitted on to the Internet into packets and reassemble it at its destination. This allows the Internet to operate as a packet-switched network where the various data packets may travel different routes to reach the same destination. This design allows information to be transmitted through the Internet at faster speeds than circuit-switched networks, where, once a connection is made, that part of the network is dedicated only to that connection.”) (citations omitted); see also Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parameters of Trademark Use in Entertainment, 64 Fla. L. Rev. 1011, 1082 (2009).} The whole point of the network is that electrons flow relatively randomly through cables—and now wirelessly—to avoid a single point of failure bringing down the entire network.\footnote{139}{Ku, supra note 138.} Thus, premising jurisdictional queries on electron flows is unlikely to lead to principled or predictable legal rules.

One reason for the tendency to focus on the physical aspects of the network is derived from difficulties inherent in the other obvious option—to consider where the defendant actually engaged in the harmful conduct. When the defendant’s conduct is an online communication and that communication is accessible globally, the purposeful availment inquiry is not very meaningful. If a defendant posts, for example, a defamatory comment about a plaintiff on a blog that is accessible globally, is it fair to say that the defendant has purposely availed herself of the jurisdiction of the entire world?\footnote{140}{See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, ¶ 54 (Austl.) (noting defamation defendant’s concern about being haled into court in any jurisdiction in which its online publications were accessed).}
Another alternative is to create a blanket rule that the appropriate jurisdiction for litigation is the place where the plaintiff suffers harm. Several courts have taken this approach, and it certainly seems logical, at least from the plaintiff’s point of view. One could easily argue that plaintiffs in, say, defamation suits should not have to go to foreign courts to sue defendants who may be taking advantage of their geographical distance or of more lenient defamation laws in a particular jurisdiction.

However, erring on the side of the plaintiff’s jurisdiction may not be particularly fair to the online defendant. If a defendant is potentially liable for any comments made online under the laws of any jurisdiction in which a plaintiff resides or does business, it may be impossible for that defendant to protect itself from unexpected foreign litigation. The reality is that many defendants today do not even know where a plaintiff is located or where that plaintiff might suffer harm.

Under a rule that favored the plaintiff’s jurisdiction, exposure to significant risks of litigation in foreign jurisdictions may ultimately chill much online speech. Defamation defendants have argued against such a rule in past litigation. These concerns come into sharp relief in situations where defendants are amateur journalists and social commentators, rather than large scale media conglomerates, as is increasingly the case online. Small individual defendants are less likely than a large media outlet to possess the wherewithal to defend proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction.

While there are a number of counterarguments to concerns about unfairness to defendants, the point of this discussion is not to identify the correct rule on personal jurisdiction in cyberspace. Rather, it is to

141. See, e.g., id. at 606–07 (“[O]rdinarily, defamation is to be located at the place where the damage to reputation occurs. Ordinarily that will be where the material which is alleged to be defamatory is available in comprehensible form assuming, of course, that the person defamed has in that place a reputation which is thereby damaged.”); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984) (granting jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant with respect to a defamation action that harmed the plaintiff, actress Shirley Jones, in California).


144. See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick (2002) 210 C.L.R. 575, ¶ 54 (Austl.) (arguing that damages award will only be made in a defamation case where the plaintiff realistically has a reputation to harm in the place where publication is received); id. ¶ 53 (noting that plaintiffs are unlikely to sue in a jurisdiction outside the defendant’s forum unless a judgment in that forum would be of real value to the plaintiff and the answer to that question may depend on whether, and to what extent, the defendant holds assets in the plaintiff’s forum); id. ¶ 54 (“[I]n all except the most unusual of cases, identifying the person about whom material is to be published will readily identify the defamation law to which that person may resort.”).
demonstrate that cyberspace raises unique challenges in terms of jurisdiction. It is necessary within the cyberlaw field to investigate factors that differentiate cyberspace from physical space in the context of these jurisdictional challenges. Unlike physical-world publications, information disseminated over the Internet can generally be received anywhere in the world, subject only to technological limitations such as firewalls and encryption. Thus the default position in Internet publication is effectively opposite to that in the physical world. Online information defaults to being published to everyone globally, whereas in the physical world information is only published to those to whom the publisher has specifically directed it. Thus, the risk of being haled into court in an unexpected foreign jurisdiction is significantly higher for a defendant in an Internet case than in a traditional, physical world case. SOPA itself recognizes the problem inherent in global online communications through its attempt to impose monitoring obligations on domestic ISPs to limit infringing activities conducted or facilitated by foreign actors.\textsuperscript{145}

The Internet may raise additional challenges related to jurisdiction. In Internet-based litigation, there is a high risk that the initial focus of the litigation will be on jurisdictional issues, rather than on the substance of the plaintiff’s complaint. Because of the disproportionately high number of jurisdictional issues in cyberspace cases in comparison with physical-world cases, a greater number of cyberspace cases might be disposed of at the jurisdictional stage without ever getting to a determination of the parties’ substantive rights. The cyberlaw field can provide a forum within which jurisdictional rules may be streamlined and harmonized. Such a result would minimize the time and expense spent on initial jurisdictional questions and would allow judges to focus more on exploring and developing the substantive rights and obligations of parties in cyberspace disputes.

A recent example of a case in which jurisdictional considerations arguably detracted from an investigation of the plaintiff’s substantive rights is \textit{Chang v. Virgin Mobile USA}.\textsuperscript{146} In this case, Chang brought inter alia a privacy claim against Virgin Mobile for unauthorized use of a photograph of Chang in an advertising campaign.\textsuperscript{147} Chang resided in Texas while the advertising campaign took place in Australia.\textsuperscript{148} Virgin


\textsuperscript{147} Id. at *1–2 (“Plaintiffs Susan Chang . . . as next friend of Alison Chang . . . a minor . . . sued defendant Virgin Mobile Pty Ltd. . . . an Australian-based company, in Texas state court on claims for invasion of privacy, libel, breach of contract, and copyright infringement based on Virgin Australia’s use of an image of Alison . . . in its ‘Are You With Us or What’ advertising campaign . . . .”).

\textsuperscript{148} Id.
Mobile had found the picture of Chang online and copied it from a public photo-sharing website. Virgin Mobile had only utilized the photograph within Australia on bus shelter ad shells. It had never used the advertisement in the United States, nor had it posted the ad to the Internet. Because the defendant had never directed any of its conduct towards the state of Texas, the American court held that it could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant.

This decision effectively left Chang without a substantive remedy. For one thing, she was an individual and a teenager without the wherewithal to sue the defendants in Australia. Perhaps more significantly, Australia does not have the same privacy torts available to plaintiffs as the United States. In the United States, Chang could have claimed misappropriation of her personal image under the misappropriation limb of privacy tort law. The misappropriation tort provides a remedy to a plaintiff where a defendant has made an unauthorized commercial use of her name or likeness. There is no similar tort in Australia, even if Chang had the wherewithal to litigate there. Thus, the resolution of the dispute for lack of jurisdiction foreclosed the possibility of a substantive discussion of the legal nature of privacy rights and expectations in the global online arena.

There may in fact be nothing wrong with the ultimate holding in Chang. If Texas is not the correct forum for litigation, then Chang is out of luck. Too readily allowing plaintiffs to sue in their home jurisdictions in Internet cases, as noted above, may impose insurmountable burdens on defendants and hence on online speech more generally.

However, Chang is far from the only Internet case that has been effectively resolved by a jurisdictional inquiry either because the plaintiff could not afford to sue in the defendant’s jurisdiction or because the plaintiff did not have a colorable claim under the defendant’s law. Many Internet cases have historically been effectively resolved at the jurisdiction determination stage, or have used the jurisdictional inquiry as a testing ground for considering the merits of...
The proportion of Internet cases raising jurisdictional issues is likely to be higher than the proportion of non-Internet cases. Thus, Internet law creates greater risks of jurisdictional inquiries detracting from the opportunity to debate and develop substantive legal rules.

A reconceptualized cyberlaw field could contribute a more systematic ex ante approach to the development and application of jurisdictional principles in Internet-related cases. The ability to more quickly, efficiently, and predictably resolve jurisdictional problems would allow greater focus on developing more meaningful substantive rules for online conduct. Of course, jurisdictional issues both online and offline are often extremely difficult to resolve. Nevertheless, the ability to focus specifically on cyberspace-related jurisdictional problems within a more unified theoretical framework is likely to assist in more principled and predictable legal developments.

**CONCLUSION**

Rather than being dismissed as a cyber “law of the horse,” cyberlaw is much more effectively characterized as a law of the intermediated information exchange with global dimensions. There is a pressing need to recognize a body of legal theory within which to debate the role of Internet intermediaries within the global information economy. Across a variety of fields—intellectual property, defamation, privacy, fraud, etc.—Internet intermediaries face common problems. Yet there is currently no obvious theoretical space within which to debate these issues.

Cyberlaw scholars are overly focused on subject classifications of disputes. They fail to draw together common threads relating to Internet intermediaries in relation to issues such as balancing the need to encourage online innovation against the need to prevent online wrongs. Thus, the pastiche of legislation and case law that has developed over the past fifteen years or so has been inconsistent; it has depended on the specific subject matter at hand in a particular context.

The cyberlaw of the future should revolve around detailed analysis of the legal responsibilities of Internet intermediaries in many contexts. It should also incorporate jurisdictional considerations to ensure that the development of substantive legal principles is not hindered by overemphasis on procedural questions that could be more readily answered through development of clearer ex ante rules.

Refocusing the cyberlaw field on the global nature of the conflicts and the central role of online intermediaries will bring forth a more

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155. For example, in Cable News Network v. CNNews.com, 162 F. Supp. 2d 484 (E.D. Va. 2001), the court avoided substantive issues related to cybersquatting by effectively resolving the dispute on jurisdictional grounds. Id. at 492.
A cohesive and predictable set of rules to govern online conduct. Once the legal rules are more clearly delineated in terms of ascertaining the substantive legal rights and obligations of intermediaries, the law can turn to other important issues of cyberspace regulation, such as: (a) ensuring conformity of laws with emerging online norms; (b) ensuring appropriate remedies for online harms; and (c) creating appropriate liability rules for closed versus open service networks. Until a theoretical framework emerges within which to debate these issues, however, we are stuck with piecemeal and fragmented consideration of the legal role of online intermediaries within disparate subjects such as intellectual property, defamation, privacy, and fraud. It is time to reconceptualize the cyberlaw field with respect to what is truly unique about it: the fact that it governs global communications intermediated by one or more third parties.

156. See Lipton, “We, the Paparazzi,” supra note 32, at 931–32 (discussing the distinction between closed and open online networks).