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In most federal systems, constitutional decision-making occurs at both the national and subnational levels, and therefore, a more complete and accurate understanding of constitutional law requires careful study of subnational constitutional dynamics as well as the relationship between national and subnational issues. This articles reviews Constitutional Dynamics in Federal Systems – Subnational Perspectives (Michael Burgess & G Alan Tarr, eds., 2012) (“Constitutional Dynamics”), which includes studies analyzing issues of constitutional change in eleven different political systems from the unique perspective of subnational law and politics. The article contends that this bottom-up perspective reveals two important themes. First, subnational politics have become a hotbed for popular constitutional involvement and activism. Drawing on the studies presented in Constitutional Dynamics, the article discusses the mechanisms for direct democracy that appear across federal systems and then explores several unique incentives that may explain why there is generally greater popular involvement in constitutional politics at the subnational level than at the national level. Second, the article identifies two pathways of bottom-up constitutional change within federal systems. Bottom-up constitutional change can occur when subnational units formally adopt new constitutional laws that percolate through the federal system and result in constitutional change at the national level. In those instances, subnational constitutions facilitate systemic change because they provide an institutional home for a new norm to germinate. Bottom-up change can also occur more aggressively when subnational groups capitalize on opportunities such as constitutional litigation and political campaigning to bring issues to the national agenda. In those instances, subnational constitutions provide an entry point for groups to bring conflicts and reform proposals within the existing political system.