Abstract
The Supreme Court described the principles of the dormant Commerce Clause first in Gibbons v. Ogden (1824), coined the doctrine’s name in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co. (1829), and revisited the doctrine after a lengthy period of “dormancy” in National Pork Producers Council v. Ross (2023). Over the nearly two centuries that the Supreme Court has handled dormant Commerce Clause matters, one aspect that stands out is the unique nature of the industries that give rise to claims. Thoroughbred horse racing, a sport older than the United States itself, is one such example. The Supreme Court previously denied certiorari on the question of whether state-imposed restrictions that prevent horses purchased in claiming races from competing outside the state for a specified period are constitutional. The constitutional question of the “claiming jail” depends upon a series of suits filed by long-time Thoroughbred owner Jerry Jamgotchian against several state horse racing governing bodies. Kentucky, the state renowned for Thoroughbred breeding and racing, stands contrary to California and Indiana, where similar claiming jail provisions have been struck down by the courts as unconstitutional under the dormant Commerce Clause. Additionally, there is a peculiar absence of legal challenges to “claiming jail” provisions in Florida, another state integral to horse racing. This Note highlights the divergence of state court rulings and silence from Florida courts. Furthermore, this Note argues why Florida’s renowned Gulfstream Park has evaded litigation and analyzes whether it will continue to do so in the future. In doing so, this Note contributes to the ongoing debate over state regulations and their intersection with interstate commerce in the horse racing industry.
Recommended Citation
Zeron, Alexis
(2025)
"Dormant Commerce Clause: Claiming the Future of Horse Racing,"
Florida Entertainment and Sports Law Review: Vol. 4:
Iss.
1, Article 7.
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/feslr/vol4/iss1/7
