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Taariq Lewis

Abstract

During an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits jurors from testifying about statements made or incidents that occurred during jury deliberations, including jurors' subjective mental processes used in reaching the verdict. This rule is often called the "no-impeachment" rule. The no-impeachment rule promotes the finality of verdicts, facilitates free and vibrant discussion by jurors without fear their verdict will be questioned, and ensures that jurors are not harassed by litigants seeking to challenge their verdict. However, in a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Court held that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right trumps the no-impeachment rule in one specific circumstance: Post-verdict juror testimony is permitted when a juror's clear statement reveals that the juror's decision to convict was based on racial animus. This "racial animus" exception to the no-impeachment rule is a necessary safeguard for defendants' Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights because of the deep-seated history of racial discrimination within America's criminal justice system.

This Note argues for a framework that would also extend exceptions to the no-impeachment rule to suspect classes that experience non-racial biases, but only if there is substantial evidence that the suspect class experiences widespread bias in the jury system. This Note applies this proposed framework to anti-LGBTQ bias because there is sufficient evidence that the LGBTQ community experiences pervasive bias within the jury system. Creating additional exceptions to the no-impeachment rule will not greatly undermine the finality of verdicts or open the jury system up to far more challenges because, like in Pena-Rodriguez, the threshold for its application will be very high.

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