Abstract
Opposition to anticompetitive coordination once animated merger policy. But evidence now suggests that coordinated effects challenges are disfavored and rarely pursued. This stark change in enforcement is both puzzling and troubling. Coordinated effects challenges are antitrust law’s best and often only opportunity to combat anticompetitive coordination in concentrated markets. Why are coordinated effects theories not being vigorously pursued? This Article exposes the decline in coordinated effects enforcement and the threat it poses to the maintenance of competitive markets. It does so in three steps. First, it surfaces the special role that coordinated effects enforcement plays in the antitrust framework. Second, it documents the decline in coordinated effects enforcement using multiple data sources. Third, it traces the causes of this decline to discrete changes in antitrust law and enforcement policy. After exposing the logical and economic errors in these changes, this Article proposes steps to restore coordinated effects enforcement to appropriate prominence.
Recommended Citation
D. Daniel Sokol and Sean P. Sullivan,
The Decline of Coordinated Effects Enforcement and How to Reverse It,
76 Fla. L. Rev.
265
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol76/iss2/1