Abstract
Qui tam is a procedural device that has been part of the American legal landscape since well before the founding era. Today, however, qui tam is under attack. Scholars and litigants alike have argued that qui tam is unconstitutional under Article II and that private plaintiffs who bring qui tam suits lack Article III standing. But there is something fundamentally strange about suggesting that this device, which was commonly utilized by the First Congress, is no longer compatible with our modern constitutional doctrines. Something has to give. Drawing on the traditional public–private rights framework of justiciability, this Article seeks to resolve the tension by arguing that qui tam may only be used to assign the federal government’s private rights claims and may not be used to assign public rights claims at all. In advancing the private rights model of qui tam, this Article hopes to assuage critics’ constitutional concerns, bring harmony to this corner of federal courts doctrine, and preserve the vitality of this ancient mechanism for centuries more to come.
Recommended Citation
Sarah Leitner,
The Private Rights Model of Qui Tam,
76 Fla. L. Rev.
865
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol76/iss4/1