Abstract
Originalism has a democracy problem. Among prevailing theories of constitutional interpretation—pragmatism, common-law constitutionalism, popular constitutionalism, and Elysian representation-reinforcement—originalism uniquely creates a legal environment in which antidemocracy is viable. That is, it uniquely imperils democratic structures, practices, and norms that are essential to modern democratic self-government. This fundamental flaw is most apparent when considering the relationship between election law (a conspicuously non-originalist area of law) and originalism. Accordingly, this Article uses election law as a heuristic for illustrating one of originalism’s central deficiencies. It is the first extended treatment of election law and originalism—a topic of heightened salience following the Supreme Court’s originalist turn.
Recommended Citation
Joshua S. Sellers,
Originalism, Election Law, and Democratic Self-Government,
76 Fla. L. Rev.
1613
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol76/iss6/2
