Abstract
When the potential for a circuit split arises, courts face competing values in determining the best course of action. A circuit may strive to balance consistency, predictability, uniformity, and correctness, among other values. But balancing uniformity and correctness is beyond the circuit’s remit; to engage in it frustrates the constitutional structure and congressional design of the federal judiciary. In other words, it is an illegitimate form of adjudication. Contemplating uniformity between circuits throws courts into the world of policymaking, a domain rightly reserved for the political branches.
By prioritizing uniformity, courts not only overstep their bounds but also introduce additional challenges. Such a focus stifles dialogue between circuits, exacerbates the counter-majoritarian problem, and obstructs judicial decisionmaking. The rationale is based on a fallacious way of reasoning and distorts judicial decisionmaking.
Courts should refrain from letting uniformity drive their decisions, leaving the responsibility of achieving national uniformity to the Supreme Court and Congress. This method of adjudication ensures that the courts stay within their constitutionally confined role, and leaves policymaking to the political branches.
Understanding this dynamic can help distill what a coherent and valid theory of adjudication could look like. A theory of adjudication must be constrained by and further constitutional values. As shown here, a valid theory of adjudication cannot and must not include circuit uniformity.
Recommended Citation
Jacob Sandler,
Uncompelling Uniformity,
76 Fla. L. Rev.
1961
(2024).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol76/iss6/7