Abstract
In the wake of Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, affirmative action proponents should pursue a First Amendment approach. Private universities, which are speaking associations that express themselves through the collective speech of faculty and students, may be able to assert an expressive association right, based on Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, to choose their faculty and students. This theory has been recently strengthened by 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis.
I discuss various complexities and counterarguments: (1) Race is not different from sex or sexual orientation for purposes of the doctrine. (2) The market context may not matter, especially after 303 Creative. (3) The conditional-federal-funding context does give the government more power than a simple regulatory context; the government will still be able to induce race-neutrality by the threat of withdrawing federal funds, but the unconstitutional conditions doctrine precludes draconian penalties such as withdrawing all funds from the entire institution based only on affirmative action in some units. (4) This theory doesn’t apply to public institutions.
I also explore the potential flexibilities of this theory, based on recent litigation. The scope of the Boy Scouts exception might vary based on (1) what counts as substantial interference with expressive organizations, (2) what counts as a compelling governmental interest, and, most importantly, (3) what it takes for activity to be expressive.
Recommended Citation
Alexander Volokh,
Expressive Discrimination: Universities' First Amendment Right to Affirmative Action,
77 Fla. L. Rev.
75
(2025).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol77/iss1/2
