Abstract
This article examines the questionable jurisprudence allowing the United States to override treaties unilaterally, freely negotiated between two sovereign nations, through the later-in-time doctrine. Through the perspective of tax conventions, this article provides an overview of the historical development and context of unilateral treaty overrides. The following analysis will demonstrate the flawed reasoning behind the enactment of the later-in-time doctrine; the necessity to distinguish between Indian and sovereign nations; the contravention of the executive branch’s treaty powers; the flawed interpretations of the Supremacy Clause; and the growing requirement to fulfill international obligations.
The analysis provides a plausible solution by applying a heightened scrutiny to domestic tax statutes attempting to override prior-in-time treaties. The call for heightened scrutiny is to be applied before potential overrides are granted; it is not meant to displace Congress’ power to override international tax treaties by way of the tax code. In the case that an override is allowed, the void left from the unfulfilled obligations should spur the United States to make restitution to the parties injured.
Recommended Citation
Mark J. Wolff,
Congressional Unilateral Tax Treaty Overrides: The "Latter in Time Doctrine" is Out of Time!,
9 Fla. Tax Rev.
(2010).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/ftr/vol9/iss1/10