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University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy

Abstract

For over eighty years, a constitutional battle has been waged over the President’s power to use military force without congressional approval. The Constitution separated the power to declare war and execute the conflict between Congress and the President. But presidents continue to assert inherent authority to initiate limited armed conflicts. This debate over presidential war powers represents a pervasive tension in the United States. On the one hand, the United States is a constitutional republic seeking to preserve democratic governance through separation of powers and electoral accountability. On the other hand, the United States is a global hegemon that needs to respond quickly to challenges to its international interests. While this broader tension is too large for an individual paper, this Article explores the topic through a specific test proposed to define when the President can unilaterally use military force, the “national interest” test. While most disregard this test as meaningless, this Article argues that the “national interest” test offers an effective means of reining in presidential war powers when additional limiting principles are included.

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