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University of Florida Journal of Law & Public Policy

Abstract

The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC) challenges the constitutional and federalist principles embedded in the Electoral College system. By attempting to bypass the traditional amendment process, the NPVIC risks destabilizing the carefully calibrated balance between state and national sovereignty that has guided presidential elections for centuries. Rooted in federalism, the Electoral College was designed to ensure equitable representation among states, giving smaller and less populous states a meaningful voice in the electoral process.

This Article critiques the NPVIC through a comprehensive examination of its constitutional, practical, and federalist implications. It analyzes the constitutional hurdles posed by the Electors Appointment Clause, the Compact Clause, the Guarantee Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause. Drawing on recent Supreme Court precedents, including Chiafalo v. Washington, this Article contends that while states retain considerable discretion in managing elections, their actions are constrained by constitutional principles designed to preserve the integrity of state sovereignty and national cohesion.

Beyond legal concerns, the NPVIC faces significant practical challenges, as public resistance to electoral reform underscores the difficulty of achieving lasting change through unilateral interstate agreements. This Article argues that meaningful reform of the Electoral College requires adherence to the rigorous deliberation and broad national consensus embodied in the Article V amendment process. Ultimately, the NPVIC represents not just a constitutional shortcut but a threat to the foundational principles that have sustained American republicanism.

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