Document Type
Note
Abstract
One company is “hooked” to financial inducements that amount to “cocaine.” Another company must resort to hiding its relationship with a party and labeling its brochures “secrets and confidential.” A third company was beaten into “guacamole” in retaliation for its relationship with this same party. A fourth company “had a gun to his head” and must stop buying from this same party. What would bring out such outrageous allegations? The answer is Advanced Micro Devices’ antitrust claim against Intel for product bundling and alleged coercive practices. In regards to the bundling allegations, the treatment of the antitrust analysis can differ depending on whether the bundling, or tying, behavior involves only patented products or a combination of patented and non-patented products. This Note explores the treatment of patents in antitrust cases, and proposes that having a patent on a product should not presume to confer market power, a key element in establishing an illegal monopoly under the Sherman Act. Specifically, this Note addresses the possible implications on patent to non-patent tying agreements after the U.S. Supreme Court hears Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink, and suggests that the antitrust market power analysis should mirror the patent misuse market power analysis.
Recommended Citation
Sarah Knight,
Patents & Antitrust: Does a Patent Confer Market Power? A Look at the Upcoming Supreme Court Case: Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink,
11 J. Tech. L. & Pol'y
(2006).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/jtlp/vol11/iss1/8