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Florida Journal of International Law

Abstract

This article analyzes the legality of the Helms-Burton Act under the WTO and GATT rules, with particular emphasis on the national security exception and the use of this exception by the United States to justify its policy towards Cuba and its trading partners. Part one describes the contextual background and specific events leading up to the passage of the Helms-Burton Act and its four key provisions. Part II discusses the international reaction to the passage of Helms-Burton and the growing dissatisfaction among the United States major trading partners with the use of unilateral economic sanctions as a primary tool of U.S. foreign policy. Part III analyzes the various national security arguments for the employment of economic sanctions against Iraq, Iran, and Libya, and how similar arguments can be used to justify the imposition of economic sanctions on Cuba. Part IV examines the applicability of the GATT national security exception to Helms-Burton as well as the strength of foreign claims in opposition to the secondary boycott imposed by Title III of the Act. Part V describes the important changes to the GATT dispute resolution system following the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations and how the Helms-Burton Act will probably fare under the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Finally, this article concludes that the death knell of the Helms-Burtin Act before the WTO is by no means a foregone conclusion. Though the violations of various articles under the WTO Agreements appear to be clear-cut, Helms-Burton’s survival depends largely on how well U.S. negotiators argue the national security exception before a dispute settlement panel. The expected battle over the Helms-Burton Act in the WTO will be won or lost on this issue.

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