Abstract
This Article will proceed as follows. The first part will briefly discuss emergencies and the types of questions they raise for government. The second part will largely be a historical survey of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence dealing with emergencies from the Civil War to the present day. This survey will show that when it comes to emergencies, the Court largely perceives itself not as the guardian of individual rights, but as an enforcer of the political process and separation of powers scheme. The third part will discuss the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach and present a possible wrinkle. The fourth part is comparative. In order to demonstrate that different separation of powers schemes produce different judicial reasoning methods, I will discuss emergency jurisprudence from Israel, which has a parliamentary system. The fifth part will conclude by offering some preliminary thoughts on the role of institutions and the importance of institutional design.
Recommended Citation
Shinar, Adam
(2008)
"Constitutions in Crisis: A Comparative Approach to Judicial Reasoning and Separation of Powers,"
Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 20:
Iss.
2, Article 1.
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol20/iss2/1