Abstract
This article will focus on how the Fast-Track procedure will operate for the Uruguay Round and NAFTA and how their enemies can “derail” the Fast-Track. First, I will briefly review the historical events leading to adoption of the Fast-Track procedure. Second, I will discuss which interest groups might challenge the Uruguay Round and/or NAFTA even after the Fast-Track extension. Third, I will track a hypothetical Trade Agreements Act of 1992 (or the North American Free Trade Agreement Implementing Act) through the Fast-Track process and note potential deficiencies in the process. Fourth, I will examine the various methods by which their opponents and their Congressional allies might seek to achieve their goals by modifying or retracting the Fast-Track procedure. Fifth, I will discuss the alternatives available to the President if the Fast-Track derails.
Recommended Citation
Sim, Edmund Walter
(1990)
"Derailing the Fast-Track for International Trade Agreements,"
Florida Journal of International Law: Vol. 5:
Iss.
3, Article 6.
Available at:
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol5/iss3/6